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The purpose of this thesis is to show that a hegemonic discourse 
has developed through the literature based on Lyndon Baines 
Johnson. This thesis also serves to challenge the discourse that 
has developed through the use of Archival research in order to gain 
a more informed understanding of the legacy of LBJ.  To test this 
hypothesis, the existing literature has been examined and 
organised into primary and secondary (those who knew Johnson 
and those who did not)  this allows us to establish if a discourse 
has developed, how it has developed and how it affects our 
perception of the Johnson Presidency. Secondly, Archival sources 
and data are used to challenge the hegemonic discourse that has 
developed. It is apparent that by conducting this research, the 
hegemonic discourse is mainly developed and perpetuated through 
secondary literature. When looking at the archival sources, it is 
apparent that this discourse is underdeveloped and omits key 
features of the Johnson Presidency that could drastically alter our 
perception of his time in office and ultimately his legacy as a 
President of the United States. 
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Introduction 
The Purpose of this research project is to critically analyse and challenge the recognised 
and established body of work that currently serves as a source of knowledge and debate on 
a key figure in American political history. The hypothesis of this thesis is to challenge the 
hegemonic discourse that has developed in relation to the Johnson. This will be achieved 
firstly by demonstrating that a biographical hegemonic cannon has developed, which has 
created an uneven narrative of Lyndon Baines Johnson and his time in office. Secondly, the 
biographical hegemonic cannon can be challenged by using archival research.  In 2008 
Barack Obama gave his Primary night speech in North Carolina. Obama asked the party and 
nation to remember ‘that we are the party of Jefferson and Jackson; of Roosevelt and 
Kennedy; and that we are at our best when we lead with principle; when we lead with 
conviction; when we summon an entire nation around a common purpose – a higher 
purpose’ (Obama, 2008). Here Johnson has been overlooked; this could be due to the fact 
that President Johnson’s reputation has been so tarnished throughout the years. 
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Methodology 
We are inclined to assume that the source of knowledge, i.e. a publication or professional 
teacher is a source of expertise. The expert opinion is largely regarded as the opinion that 
holds the most validity. This phenomenon is most apparent when dealing with a subjective 
issue that cannot be tested by way of experiment or output. It could be argued that the 
acceptance of an opinion presented by those deemed as experts is most apparent in the 
development of historical narrative.  It is accepted that the people writing the books and 
articles are the experts, mainly because you are reading their published book or article and 
therefore the narrative in these scholarly articles and books is legitimised by the market. The 
increasing use of knowledge as a commodity that we can trade has only added to this.  Of 
course, this is not to say that what is written is not an accurate narrative, but, in the reading 
and interpreting of historical discourse, like in the judicial or legislative process, it is always 
important to assess the legitimacy of the expert opinion so as not to create a discourse that 
refracts the actual course of events.  
 
The issue of acceptance of biographical writing as the expert opinion and the decreasing 
objectivity of an issue derives from the Foucaudian concept of knowledge as power, our 
casual acceptance that the people who are writing about Johnson are the experts; this then 
limits our view of what we know about Johnson to what we have been told (Foucault, 1980). 
The biographers who are writing the life and times of a person hold great power in that they 
can shape the legacy of that person or historical figure. This in turn affects our 
understanding of that person and, the moral or political lessons to be learned from them. 
Philosopher Jacques Ranciere’s ‘On the Ignorant School Master’ contributes to gaining a 
greater insight in to this issue. Ranciere talks of the initial acceptance of inequality between 
those who are emancipated by knowledge and those who are not. In first accepting this 
inequality, we are leaving ourselves open to be misguided in our lessons (Ranciere, 1991).  
 
To write a biography with no agenda or bias towards the subject matter is impossible. 
Therefore to write a biography with enough credibility to be accepted as ‘the most likely’ 
account of the truth, it must conform to a number of criteria; the writer must adhere to the 
accepted notion of how history is written  using factual information, evidence, counter 
arguments and critical analysis through philosophical or political debate.  This allows the 
author to hide any biases and opinions behind credibility which is created by conforming to 
this accepted scholarly format. It is therefore possible for the biographer to express their 
perception of what the information is telling them, to create a narrative that is accepted as ‘a 
most likely’ account of the truth (Munslow, 2012, p.g.69). This most likely account of the truth 
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can often become the most dominant historical narrative. For the Johnson Presidency, it is 
apparent that this is the case; the numerous biographies written about Johnson have created 
a hegemonic discourse of his time in office and the years before.  In many cases, even the 
more sympathetic biographers can fixate on certain personality traits, detracting from the 
external aspects of his time, which in reality had more effect on his presidency than the 
personality traits that are so extensively investigated. 
 
 By creating a well-rounded scholarly paper or book, it is possible to weave the threads of 
judgement and personal agenda through a scholarly structure that creates legitimacy. When 
assessing the role of biographies it is also important to establish what type of history is being 
communicated. The nature of a biography lends itself easily to social science. Munslow 
describes this type of history as ‘’historicism’ that can be defined as the idea of “social 
science” and social science-inspired ’historying’ (in particular) can predict future 
developments on the basis of discoverable laws of ‘historical change’ (Munslow, 2012, pg. 
69). By writing a biography, most historians are trying to communicate a lesson and the 
concept of learning from past events. The way in which the biography is written is therefore 
subject to the author’s opinion of whether that person is someone we can positively learn 
from or avoid the mistakes made by that person. This enforces the notion that some 
biographies are either critical or sympathetic in their approach.   
 
To assess the role of the biographer there must be a case study that allows legitimacy to be 
tested. This paper will explore the Johnson Presidency as this case study. Presenting 
personal opinion is not the objective of this paper but, an assessment of the dominant 
historical narrative of the Johnson Presidency and how it has been affected by the role of the 
biographer or expert, is. In estimation, this paper will allow for a more diverse view of the 
presidency and therefore more insight can be given into the aspects of the Johnson 
Presidency that have not been given their full credit or, have been given too much. The main 
objective of this paper however, is to show an example of how the hegemonic discourse of 
historical narrative can be contested, by first looking at how an author has gained legitimacy 
and then, to what extent has that author, along with their peers, created the historical 
discourse in question. Also explaining why some biographies emphasise the analysis of 
some aspects of Johnson’s presidency that are not, in the grand scheme of things, as 
important or influential as other aspects. 
 
The method of this research is qualitative and draws on extensive archival research from the 
Lyndon Baines Johnson Presidential Library in Austin, Texas. One method of research that 
is used in this thesis is Narrative Inquiry in which the interpretation of event is analysed in 
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conjunction with the event itself. The way in which an event or person is being described or 
recounted can give greater insight into things that are harder to understand historically.  For 
example, by looking at biographies, interviews, or notes there are elements of emotions and 
detail that would not be found in other documents. However, there is also a downside to this 
type of research method as it is reliant on the person telling the story; therefore human error 
plays a major role for example, memory lapse and clouded judgement due to personal or 
external events/issues (Tracey, 2013). Archival research plays the largest role in this thesis 
and therefore it is important to establish some of the problems that could occur through this 
method, and of course, understand the benefits of this methodology. The reactivity problem 
of collecting data is minimised with the use of archival research as the data is already 
collected, therefore there is no interaction with the participants, and this is particularly 
significant when taking into account the purpose of this thesis. The archival data used in this 
thesis can be accessed by anyone in a relatively short amount of time (compared with a 
study that relies on data that does not yet exist). This reinforces the notion that the 
biographical cannon is being perpetuated by the authors and historians that have previously 
written about Johnson. This is due to the recurrence of the same themes, even though the 
data that could be used to expand on the historical narrative is readily available for the writer 
to use. There are also downsides to the use of archival data, while some sources of data are 
deemed better than others, it is safe to say that the funding and standards of the LBJ 
Presidential Library are high, however the library is monitored very carefully, the Library itself 
was set up by Johnson himself. Although this was in the late 60’s, it must be taken into 
consideration that some documents may have been omitted from the archives for various 
reasons and these reasons can never really be established without seeing the documents in 
question (Jackson, 2008).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8 
 
Why Johnson? 
 
As part of my undergraduate dissertation, I conducted research on the Johnson Presidency 
to assess the nature of his time in office. While reading some of the existing literature on the 
Johnson Presidency it became apparent to me that there were some major themes that 
occurred throughout. It was also apparent that there was over emphasis on these themes 
and a lack of information on other aspects of his presidency. This led me to believe that 
there was a hegemonic narrative that had developed though the existing literature on 
Johnson. From the perspective of someone who had little previous knowledge of the 
Johnson Presidency, it appeared that some aspects of his time in office were being omitted 
from the historical legacy of Johnson.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9 
 
The Johnson Presidency- a brief overview 
 
Early 1960s America was a complicated era for the American government. The Cold War, 
including the beginnings of the Vietnam conflict and the intensity of the Cuban Missile Crisis, 
created an air of fear and mistrust. The Civil Rights movement, although it held the promise 
of great progressive reform in America, was an issue that split the nation and indeed 
Congress. The Johnson presidency was a watershed in terms of the role of the Executive; 
there had been a gradual development of the way that the Executive branch operated 
throughout the twentieth century. There are many theories as to why this change happened, 
mostly the watershed is attributed to Johnson as a person, his overreaching power and 
determination to be a Great President and the focus on Federal involvement in domestic life 
have given way to the Imperial Presidency theory that was sustained and re enforced with 
the Nixon administration (Schlesinger, 2004). However, there are many aspects that affected 
the Johnson Presidency that mainly boil down to the time in which he was in office, and the 
circumstances in which he came to be president.  
 
Kearns Goodwin brings the role of the media in the 1960s into the debate as it was never 
more apparent or encompassing of the presidency as it was when Johnson was in power. 
This meant Johnson could always be at the centre of government. He was able to contact 
any world leader in a matter of seconds, he could send commands to forces on the 
battlefield in Vietnam, and he was at the centre of the media and in the public eye at all 
times. When Johnson was enjoying the successes of his Presidency he was given full credit, 
but this intense focus on the President also had an adverse effect. It meant the failures in 
Vietnam were his failures, not the advisors, Army or Congress. To the American people it 
was his war, the successes were his and the unending failures were his. This is a very 
important issue to remember when assessing Johnson’s presidency as it leads into the 
deeper debate of how elitist democracy can result in political leadership becoming a 
popularity contest resulting in a celebrity president, subject to all the gossip and judgments 
of the general public (Fishkin, 1991).  
 
 
The Johnson Presidency began under tragic circumstances with the assassination of 
President Kennedy in Dallas, Texas. Vice President Johnson, a Texan himself, moved into 
the Oval Office while the nation grieved for their martyred president. Johnson had assumed 
that he would only ever go as far as Vice President in his political career, believing that a 
southerner would never reach the presidential office and, that he would retire back to his 
Texas ranch once JFK had served his second term, not accounting for the tragedy of the 
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President’s death and the line of succession (Valenti, 1976). For Johnson, filling the boots of 
Kennedy in the eyes of the nation was never going to be an easy task, but it was something 
that Johnson longed to do. Johnson never did win the love of the nation like Kennedy had 
done. Johnson lacked the public persona and his oratory skills were very much tailored to 
one on one conversation and at best the small audience of Congress where he thrived.  
 
The 1960s as an era itself was already set against Johnson and his success as a president. 
The decade was turning out to be one of violence, upheaval and endless social movements, 
although a positive time for reform, it meant Johnson had to move with the times, something 
many would not have expected Johnson to do. A ‘crude Texas cowboy without a Harvard 
degree’ (Matusow, 2009, pg. 376) was an image that he would fail to overcome. Johnson’s 
biggest critics, although surprising at first, were the liberal intellectuals. As the war 
progressed and its failures were becoming ever more apparent, the traditional liberalism that 
Johnson exercised in both social and foreign policy began to fragment form the constantly 
developing and reforming ideas of the New Liberals. Johnson was left behind in the old 
traditionalist 1950’s liberalism, while the intellectuals that he held so high in his estimations, 
had moved on without him (Matusow, 2009). In 1956 Arthur Schlesinger Jr. wrote a very 
accurate account on America and its liberalist tradition.  
 
‘"The great advantage of the American," Tocqueville wrote over a century 
ago, "is that he has arrived at a state of democracy without having to endure a 
democratic revolution and that he is born free without having to become so.” With no 
social revolution in his past, the American has no sense of the role of catastrophe in 
social change. Consequently, he is, by nature, a gradualist; he sees few problems 
which cannot be solved by reason and debate; and he is confident that nearly all 
problems can be solved. It is characteristically American that every war in American 
history has been followed by an outburst of historical "revisionism" seeking to prove 
that the war was unnecessary’ (Schlesinger, 11th ed. 2008, pg.83).  
  
 
In light of his background, Johnson looked an unlikely president, his education was not the 
calibre expected of a US Leader. In 1926 Johnson enrolled at the Texas State University-
San Marcos, known at the time as the Southwest Texas Teacher’s College. Johnson took a 
break from his studies due to a lack of money, and taught at a small segregated boarder 
school called Welhausen elementary in Cortulla, Texas. The school was predominantly 
Mexican immigrant children who spoke none, or very little English. Johnson made enough 
money working at the school to graduate college, and it was the lessons he learned here 
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that would affect his presidency greatly.  Johnson’s political career began to develop when in 
1930 he campaigned for Texas state senator Willy Hopkins, who following this, 
recommended him to Richard M. Kelburg. Johnson then worked as Kelburg’s legislative 
secretary; along the way Johnson widened his circle of friends and met the people who 
would allow him to climb the political ladder.  
 
In 1935 Johnson was appointed as head of the Texas National Youth Administration. This 
was an important turning point in Johnson’s political career and would have more than likely 
had a great deal of influence on his social policy plans as president. The role allowed him to 
appropriate government money for the creation of job opportunities and education of young 
Texans. No doubt this job role highlighted the issues within the field and drew to his attention 
the availability of education to the poor and how this affected America. After two years in the 
post, Johnson resigned and successfully ran for Congress.  Director of the Division of Negro 
Affairs, Mary McLeod Bethune, wrote to Johnson congratulating him on his election to 
Congress. The letter gives a brief insight into Johnson’s work at the Texas Youth 
Administration.  
 
‘Honorable Sir, 
 
Dr Horne joins me in extending to you our heartiest congratulations for the honor 
done you by the citizens of your district. 
 
We feel certain that the same energy and vigorous imagination that characterized the 
outstanding success of your program with the National Youth Administration will write 
your name high in the annals of the House of Representatives. 
 
We are indeed happy that one who has proven himself so conscious of and 
sympathetic with the needs of all the people should take his place in a Congress that 
is so indelibly writing a more human and more Christian concept of American 
Democracy. 
 
Very sincerely yours, 
 
Mary McLeod Bethune 
Director, Division of Negro Affairs’ (McLeod Bethune, 1937) 
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The letter gives an insight into Johnson’s congressional ambitions and also his standing 
within the National Youth Administration. On January 3rd 1949 Johnson is elected Senator of 
Texas and 6 years later on January 5th 1955 LBJ becomes the Senate Majority Leader. This 
is one of the most significant periods of Johnson’s political career apart from the Presidency. 
Johnson brought a new power to the office of Majority Leader. It was also a period of time 
that Lady Bird Johnson would reflect on as the happiest days of their lives (Flom, 2012). This 
success in the Senate put him in a good position for the 1960 Democratic Presidential 
candidate. However, he was beaten to the post by John F. Kennedy.  
 
When Kennedy asked Johnson to be his running partner in the upcoming election, and in 
effect asked Johnson to take the second place, Johnson accepted. This came as a surprise 
to many of Johnson’s colleagues and friends, as the Vice Presidency is not regarded as a 
position of power (something that Johnson had become accustomed to).  Johnson’s 
response to the people counselling him against accepting the position was ‘Power is where 
power goes’ (Kearns Goodwin, 1976, pg.161). Johnson also had a crippling insecurity that 
he sought to rid himself of by accepting the Vice Presidency; his Texas roots. It was not that 
he was ashamed in any way of being from Texas but, his status as not only a southern 
politician but a state politician meant that he did not feel he belonged in the unfamiliar world 
of national politics. Johnson saw the Vice Presidency as a way of shaking off this image and 
subsequently presenting himself in the national political arena (Kearns Goodwin, 1976).  
 
When President Kennedy was shot in on November 22nd 1963, Johnson was sworn in as 
President aboard Air Force One. In his first year of office, the year that belonged to 
Kennedy, Johnson was determined to honour Kennedy’s work and policies but was 
determined to become President in his own right and sought re-election in 1964 (Valenti, 
1977). Doris Kearns Goodwin interprets Johnson’s comments on his position as an 
unelected President;  
 
‘I became President. But for millions of Americans I was still illegitimate, a 
naked man with no presidential covering, a pretender to the throne, an illegal 
usurper. And then there was Texas, my home, the home of both the murder and the 
murder of the murderer. And then there were the bigots and the divider and the 
Easters intellectuals, who were waiting to knock me down before I could even begin 
to stand up. The whole thing was almost unbearable’ (Kearns Goodwin, pg 170, 
1976). 
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In 1965 Johnson went on to implement the Great Society, a legislative package focused on 
increasing the quality of life of all Americans sustainably. However, the Gulf of Tonkin 
Resolution the previous year had escalated the conflict in Vietnam seemingly without end 
and as America trenched deeper and deeper into the war in Vietnam peace became less 
likely; a tremendous anti-war movement began to spread throughout the nation. The inability 
to win or withdraw from the war in Vietnam was a constant strain on the President who 
eventually announced that he would not be seeking another term of office. Some of 
Johnson’s more positive acts as President had also brought even more distress to Johnson 
as the Civil Rights Act along with the various social movements had brought with them a rise 
in expectations which by today’s standards were vital for progression but Johnson, with the 
country now against him more than ever, could not continue.  
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Structure of the Thesis 
 
The thesis will first address the existing literature on the Johnson Presidency, firstly by 
looking at how Vietnam is a major part of the literary body; and then by looking at the 
Primary literature (by which the author has worked with, or known the President personally 
and has based their writing on this experience). Then the literature review will look at the 
secondary literature (by which the author has not known or worked with the president but it 
writing based on the experience of others, personal opinion and various methods of 
research). Chapter three will be examples of archival research drawn from the Lyndon 
Baines Johnson Presidential Library in Austin, Texas. The purpose of this will be to prove or 
disprove the hypothesis stated earlier in the thesis, by way of exemplifying the perpetuation 
of certain themes within the literature, and how the archival resources show that there are 
other aspects of the presidency that could be explored within this literature to a larger extent. 
The third chapter will consist of conclusions that can be made from the evidence shown, and 
how the Johnson Presidency is viewed today and ask if there is any room for revisionism of 
the Johnson Legacy.  
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Literature Review 
 
The aim of this chapter is to show the historical discourse of the Johnson Presidency that 
has developed by looking at some of the literature that has influenced the legacy of Johnson 
and his time in office. It will also address the issue of legitimacy of the author, how credibility 
is gained either through their writing, profession or proximity to the president himself.  By 
analysing some of this literature, it is possible to gain an understanding of why each author 
portrays the president as they do, how this is legitimised by their peers and  subsequently 
how this has created the discourse that is apparent within this field. To show this 
phenomenon to the fullest extent, this literature review will analyse the earliest literature 
which is most often written by those who knew him personally. This section will mainly 
consist of those who were in some way close to the President or have first-hand experience 
working with him. These accounts will be referred to as the primary literature. By looking at 
the existing literature in this order, it will help to create an understanding of how the historical 
discourse is created. The secondary literature will then be reviewed as a way of exemplifying 
how the discourse is created by the influence of the primary literature and subsequently, how 
it is perpetuated through the secondary literature. The literature on the social policy of LBJ 
will be the main focus of this paper as it provides the most convincing piece of evidence that 
the literature on Johnson has overlooked aspects of his time in office which play a vital role 
in understanding Johnson. Most importantly it is the aspect of his presidency that was not 
predetermined or confined by previously established legislation, policy, interests of national 
security or external organisation to the extent that foreign policy was, in particular Vietnam 
and any other Cold War related issues. While, of course, many of the programs and bills that 
Johnson pushed through Congress were influenced by the Kennedy administration and 
public opinion, his social policy was also a reflection of Johnson and his motives, hopes and 
ambitions for his presidency.  
 
 
 Firstly, the Vietnam Conflict must first be addressed to give context to the debate. While the 
existing literature on the Johnson Presidency is varied in scope, in many cases it offers an 
insight into the internal workings of the White House during the Johnson administration, and 
in some circumstances the literature can offer an insight into the President’s private life. 
Understandably most existing literature is centred on the Vietnam War and while there is a 
lot of literature that addresses Johnson’s social policies, it is apparent that many scholars 
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have chosen to focus on the undeniably negative aspect of the period in question. While the 
Vietnam War is not the primary focus of this paper, it is important to address the existing 
literature on the subject. The existing literature on Johnson is predominantly on the subject 
of the Vietnam War. The complexity of the war has allowed for a diverse and broad basis for 
debate resulting in many different schools of thought, some focusing on the ideological basis 
for the war, others on the role of the executive and legislator. While there are many different 
opinions on the conflict, the majority, if not all, will agree that the war was a failed effort for 
one reason or another. Whichever way the war in Vietnam is assessed, it is still irrefutable 
that the legacy of Johnson is still plagued by the war and its failures. The literature shows 
how Johnson’s reputation has been dominated by this war, as was his presidency. Not only 
this but as Johnson was so committed to his work and presidency, the war dominated his 
private life too, especially as his son in law was out in Vietnam fighting.  
 
 
Brian Van De Mark relays a conversation Johnson had with his generals; this conversation 
demonstrates Johnson’s frustration with the war and calls for solutions to his problem. 
Johnson urged his generals; ‘I want to know why there is nothing else. You generals have all 
been educated at the taxpayers’ expense, and you’re not giving me any ideas and any 
solutions for this damn pissant country’… ‘Now I don’t need ten generals to come in here ten 
times and tell me to bomb’ He growled. ‘I want some solutions. I want some answers’ (Van 
De Mark, 1995, pg.95). This shows Johnson’s frustration with the war and his eagerness to 
find a solution and bring an end to the war in a way that would still save face for America. 
Unfortunately, Johnson would not see an end to the war during his presidency and because 
of his role in the escalation of the war; his name will always be synonymous with the 
Vietnam conflict. 
 
Many consider the war to be a product of Johnson’s leadership style as an imperialist with 
an aggressive mentality towards foreign policy. Others see it as a valid reaction to the threat 
of communism and the domino effect. Other schools of thought see it as inevitability 
unspecific to South East Asia but an act to secure credibility in the global arena (Kolko, 
1999). While most see the war as a military failure, some would argue that the war was 
necessary to make a tough stance again the Soviets, especially after the Bay of Pigs 
incident which many argue made the US look weak (Lind, 2002). On the other hand, Walter 
Lippmann, a journalist who opposed the war, had great influence on the people of America 
at the time. Lippmann, had ‘decidedly ‘realist’’ (Riccio, 1996, pg 154) views on America’s 
foreign policy in Vietnam. Likewise, scholar and diplomat George Kennan shared these 
‘realist’ views which subsequently lead to the Minimal Realist Kennan-Lippmann school of 
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thought. Kennan and Lippmann based their writing on the premise that America had ‘greatly 
exaggerated the Soviet threat to American interests’ (Lind, 2002, pg.50) and that this 
essential have Vietnam less strategic value than the conflict implies. They also state that the 
attitudes and policies of the American government were too ideological. This was due to the 
way in which the ‘Truman Doctrine overcommitted the United States by defining American 
interests in ideological and expansive terms’ (Riccio, 1996, pg. 154).While many have their 
opinions on the fundamental basis of the war, there are also many interpretations of 
Johnson’s role in the war, in particular the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution  
 
The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution remains the most controversial aspect of Johnson’s 
involvement in Vietnam. While many scholars accept that the war in Vietnam was a product 
of many factors that Johnson was unable to control as Michael Lind’s book ‘Vietnam: The 
Necessary War’, explains that the concepts of Domino theory and the threat of The Cold 
War are very real and it was credibility on the world stage that was of the upmost importance 
for America to show strength in the global market, Lind’s most vital point being that the war 
in Vietnam was a ‘Proxy war’ (Lind, 2002, pg. 4). However, this view is contradicted when 
looking at the ways and means in which the war in Vietnam was escalated. Some scholars 
would disagree that the escalation of the war was either inevitable or a product of external 
influences on Johnson. The Gulf of Tonkin Resolutions remains a very controversial aspect 
of the Vietnam War as many question the legitimacy of its enactment, and more crucially, 
they question the wording that seemingly gave Johnson too much power when making 
decisions concerning the war in South East Asia. Ezra Y. Siff writes that the executive 
branch was able to wage its own war with limited accountability to Congress through the Gulf 
of Tonkin resolution. Siff’s book, Why the Senate Slept suggests that Congress were too 
passive when it came to the resolution, allowing Johnson and his advisors to get their own 
way and appropriate the power needed to wage war independently (Siff, 1999). The Gulf of 
Tonkin Resolution was an emergency bill, pushed through Congress after the supposed 
attack on a US navy vessel by North Vietnam, while it is not apparent that this incident ever 
happened as it was originally reported, the resolution had huge ramifications and was the 
starting point of real military intervention by American forces in Vietnam. The resolution 
stated that the US is prepared to take military action as the President determined and that 
the resolution will also expire when the President determined although it did state ‘except 
that it may be terminated earlier by concurrent resolution of the Congress’ (Gulf of Tonkin 
Resolution, 1964). 
 
Passing this sort of legislation, regardless of the fact that only two senators opposed the bill, 
is undoubtedly frustrating for those it affected. On the face of it, the Gulf of Tonkin resolution 
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is a clear violation of the checks and balances that are so central to America’s governmental 
system (McKay, 2009). However, the sentence ‘except that it may be terminated earlier by 
concurrent resolution of the Congress’ This implies that Congress are still in control of the 
extent of involvement in Vietnam. However, with a heavily democratic Congress and the 
apparent hold that Johnson had over the Senate, a two-thirds majority in both houses that is 
required to overpower a Presidential Veto would be hard to achieve, and was not achieved 
until 1973 during the Nixon administration with the Case- Church Amendment that 
essentially put an end to the military involvement in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia (Tucker, 
2011). With the basis of the war already in question, it is easy to see where the opposition to 
the war might have begun. There were also many more social factors that encroached on 
the support for Vietnam and, in turn, support for Johnson.  
 
The Vietnam War was the first conflict ever to be televised in such a way that it brought the 
war right into the living rooms of American citizens. The media had a massive presence in 
the fighting of the war and more often than not it played a vital part in determining public 
opinion of the war. The images of what was really going on in Vietnam were a sobering 
reminder of what their sons were going to fight in and just how horrific the conditions really 
were. A key figure in the media representation of the war was Walter Cronkite. Cronkite 
visited Vietnam after the Tet Offensive in 1968 to report back to the American Nation his 
findings. He reported that ‘we are mired in a stalemate’ and that ‘And with each escalation, 
the world comes closer to the brink of cosmic disaster’ (Cronkite, 1968). The realisation for 
many Americans that they or their family was fighting in a war with no end in sight was 
extremely damaging and support for the war and morale in general was low.  
 
While this is a very brief estimation of the war in Vietnam, it highlights the concerns and 
negative feeling towards the war itself and subsequently the Johnson Presidency, and while 
not all of the critical evaluations of the Johnson Presidency form their roots in the Vietnam 
debate, the general consensus of why Johnson’s time in office is seen as so unsuccessful, 
can largely be attributed to the unstable foundations of the war and the military failure that 
proceeded. As the following primary literature will show, Vietnam is not the only issue the 
biographers and scholars have with Johnson, the psychological assessment of Johnson and 
his personality is also a strong theme, among other things. But, the conclusive picture of 
Johnson is that of a war monger or of a president led down the wrong path in an attempt to 
cement his name in history as a great president.  
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Primary Literature  
 
Democrat Statesman and Veteran William Averall Harriman stated; 
 
‘LBJ was great at domestic affairs, Harry Truman had programs, but non got 
through. Kennedy had no technique. FDR talked simply during the crisis, but didn’t 
act enough later. Johnson went back past the new Frontier all the way to the New 
Deal. His Loved FDR, and it was fantastic what he did. If it hasn’t been for … 
Vietnam he’d have been the greatest president ever. Even so he’ll still be 
remembered as great.’ (Averell Harriman, 2008, pg. 307) 
 
In response to this statement Doris Kearns Goodwin, Johnson’s personal aide and friend 
writes; ‘“If it hadn’t been for Vietnam” – How many times this phrase has been spoken in 
conversations assessing Johnson’s place in history. For it is impossible to disconnect 
Johnson from that war, and undeniably that the fighting abroad halted progress toward the 
great society’ (Kearns Goodwin, 1976 pg. 251). This sentence epitomises the literature and 
general consensus of the Johnson Presidency amongst most authors. While there are those 
who have focused on the social policy of Johnson, the ramifications of the war are still 
reflected, either in the affect it had on social policy in terms of funding, or the affect the war 
had on Johnson personally in terms of his mentality and health. The quote here from 
Harriman is very significant as it outlines the issue of Vietnam versus social policy but his 
prediction of Johnson being remembered as great, is not necessarily accurate. Even though 
there are so many aspects of Johnson’s social policies, Vietnam has taken precedent when 
assessing LBJ’s legacy. Johnson was very cautious of the issue of legacy and set out to be 
a president that would be remembered for the good he had done in his time in office. In his 
first State of Union address in 1964, Johnson stated;  
 
‘If we fail, if we fritter and fumble away our opportunity in needless, senseless 
quarrels between Democrats and Republicans, or between the House and the 
Senate, or between the South and North, or between the Congress and the 
administration, then history will rightfully judge us harshly’(Johnson, 1964). 
 
Johnson asked Doris Kearns Goodwin to join him on his ranch at the end of his presidency. 
Johnson wanted Goodwin to stay with him and write down every anecdote and story that he 
had to tell about his time as a politician. This was an important task for Johnson, he hoped 
his memoirs would be read and included in the history books in years to come. This did 
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happen, but not how Johnson would have hoped.  Goodwin writes of Johnson’s need to be 
remembered and his doubts about his own legacy; 
 
‘“Listen,” he began. “I’ve been reading Carl Sandburg’s biography on Lincoln and no 
matter how great the book’s supposed to be, I can’t bring Lincoln to life. And if that’s 
true for me, one President reading about another, then there’s no chance the 
ordinary person in the future will ever remember me. No chance. I’d have been better 
off looking for immortality through my wife and children and their children in turn 
instead of seeking all that love and affection from the American people…They’re just 
too fickle”’ (Kerns Goodwin, 1976 pg. i). 
 
Goodwin was close to Johnson, while she did work with him in the same way that many 
other authors did, Goodwin was not just an aide to Johnson but also a confidante and friend. 
At the end of Johnson’s time in office, Goodwin would spend time with him on his ranch in 
Texas and write the many anecdotes and memories he had to tell. However, Goodwin also 
knew him as President, working alongside him in the White House.  This gave her a unique 
vantage point of Johnson as a President, politician and man; (if it is possible to separate 
those things) this is clear in her writing. It also gives Goodwin credibility as an author of his 
biography, in the sense that many who read her book would see her connection with 
Johnson and her time spent with him. Kearns Goodwin not only knew him in a working 
environment, but also in his home environment too. This gives Kearns Goodwin the 
legitimacy to form her opinions and intertwine them with the facts that she had learned about 
Johnson in relation to the stated theory that this allows the reader to take this account of 
Johnson as the ‘most likely account’ of the truth due to the her understanding of and 
proximity to the President. Kearns Goodwin gives a different account of Johnson and is 
understanding of the legacy of Vietnam and how this weighed down on Johnson. Kearns 
Goodwin is an exemption; it is clear that the different circumstances under which she knew 
Johnson have changed the story significantly from the literature that will come later in this 
chapter.  
 
While Goodwin is in no way ignoring any of Johnson’s misgivings, mistakes and failures, 
there is still an even balance of critical and sympathetic analysis. Goodwin explains ‘between 
1965 and 1968 five hundred social policies were created—administered with varying 
degrees of success. Some of these programs—e.g., Medicare and voting rights—succeeded 
admirably in achieving their objectives; others accomplished far less than was originally 
hoped—e.g., Model Cities and federal aid to education; still others proved self-defeating—
e.g., community action’ (Kearns Goodwin, 1976). The most telling aspect of Kearns 
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Goodwin’s understanding of Johnson and the Great Society is her explanation of what 
Johnson meant by the term. Goodwin acknowledges that ‘Even now when commentators 
discuss the Great Society, they concentrate on new programs for the relief of poverty, help 
to education, etc. – measures, in the New Deal tradition, for the just distribution of rising 
abundance’ (Kearns Goodwin, 1976). However she then goes on to recall how Johnson saw 
his Great Society and his ideas of how he saw the challenge he faced during his presidency 
and ‘“the next half century” (Kearns Goodwin, 1976 pg.211). Johnson asked, ‘“whether we 
have the wisdom to use that wealth to enrich and elevate our national life,” to prevent “old 
values” from being “buried under unbridled growth.” A rising Gross National Product and full 
employment would not by themselves create a civilisation’… ‘Where men are more 
concerned with the quality of their goals than the quantity of their goods… where the 
demands of morality, and the needs of the spirit, can be realized in the life of the nation”’ 
(Kearns Goodwin, 1976 pg. 211).   
 
Here Goodwin reminds us that the Great Society, for Johnson, was not just a legislative 
package, but a new way of life for America, or rather a revolutionary way back to the ‘old 
values’, as he put it, of American society.  The type accounts of the Great Society and 
Johnson’s intentions for it are, for the most part, missing from other literary sources. It is 
significant that Kearns Goodwin does not hold back when criticising the President, the 
overall honesty of the book is surprising as it is clear that Goodwin has an emotional 
connection to Johnson. This makes the narrative all the more convincing as an ‘account of 
the truth’ as it is apparent that the story is not coming from someone who dislikes the 
President or feels there is any sort of injustice they are victim of, or that there was a whistle 
to be blown, like other biographers may have felt. It is significant, then, that other authors 
have not taken the same view as Kearns Goodwin and analysed the Johnson Presidency in 
the way that she has done. On the other hand, Kearns Goodwin’s overall conclusion is not 
too dissimilar to that of other authors, both primary and secondary. Her conclusion of the 
President is that his legacy is indeed, tragic. ‘Tragedy’ is a word that is so often used to 
describe Johnson and it is repeated in the chapters of secondary literature countless times 
and the title of the next piece of primary literature that will be discussed in this thesis, further 
highlighting the consensus that existed at the time and the almost fashionable use of the 
term in reference to LBJ. 
 
The majority of the primary literature on Johnson is written as a narrative, rather than the 
clear scholarly format that is more apparent in the secondary literature. This story telling 
element is expected from this sort of literature as the author is indeed telling the story of their 
interpretation of Johnson and the period in question. It is important to remember the pitfalls 
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of this type of narrative as it is so easy to immediately accept this account as the most likely 
account of the truth (Muslow, 2012). While Goodwin’s credibility is strong taking into account 
the definition of a scholarly piece of literature discussed earlier in this thesis; a lot of the 
quotes and recollections of conversations with Johnson are subject to interpretation. 
Goodwin used verbatim and took notes when listening to Johnson and then interpreted 
these notes. While this is an effective method of relaying these conversations, certain 
aspects of these accounts are lost in translation. For example, tone of voice, expression and 
gestures are all things that cannot be as easily expressed through pen and paper and 
therefore some of these aspects are forgotten. Although this may seem minor, it is just a 
small example of how the reader must be vigilant, especially when the literature is used for 
more analytical purposes.  
 
In The Tragedy of Lyndon Johnson by Eric Goldman, Goldman takes a view (as mentioned 
earlier) that is quite commonly accepted within the realms of the Johnson legacy specifically 
when looking at the secondary literature. The title of the book alone indicates Goldman’s 
conclusions about Johnson.  Goldman takes a very critical view that the Johnson Presidency 
was by no means a success and, that his name will always be synonymous with the disaster 
of Vietnam. The latter point has to be accepted as a legitimate claim to a certain degree; 
however the interpretation of his presidency as being ultimately unsuccessful is where the 
issue of taking Goldman’s account and using it as a historical source, is futile. Goldman 
worked for Johnson as a special consultant, from December 1963 until September 1966. 
This not only gives Goldman a unique insight into the workings of the White House, but also 
an accurate view of Johnson himself. However, the fact Goldman worked for Johnson in the 
White House is also something to be wary of. The professional nature of the relationship 
between Goldman and Johnson means that facts can be distorted by emotions, opinions and 
circumstance, but also implies that the legitimacy of the source is strong. Again his proximity 
to the President implies that this account is the ‘most likely account of the truth’. However,  
An example of why caution must be taken when taking Goldman’s narrative of his time 
working with Johnson as a likely account of the truth is exemplified by the fact that the end of 
Johnson and Goldman’s working relationship was not altogether pleasant as Goldman 
despaired of Johnson’s unwillingness to listen to new ideas and left his service. This is 
reflected greatly in his writing with his final comments being almost entirely negative ‘He 
stood the tragic figure of an extraordinarily gifted President who was the wrong man from the 
wrong place at the wrong time under the wrong circumstances’ (Goldman, 1968 pg. 531).  
 
Goldman does not claim to be an insider writing an exposé on the President, but does 
explain the extent of his relationship with him.  Although Goldman worked closely with the 
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President and occasionally mixed at social events, he was not an intimate of Johnson. 
Goldman does claim he ‘knew and functioned with the people around them, (The President 
and Mrs Johnson) and inevitably heard a great deal of what was going on in connection with 
matters big and small’ (Goldman, 1968, pg. vi). This again creates a problem in itself when 
trying to create a true representation of the Johnson Presidency as, whilst there is factual 
information, it is laced with the opinion and hearsay that is a common problem when using 
the method of narrative inquiry.  Goldman refers to Johnson’s Texas upbringing, often 
relating most things Johnson does as a product of this, for example ‘The President, who, eye 
glasses down on his nose, scrutinized it like a bull he was considering for his ranch’ 
(Goldman, 1968, pg.55) This can be sometimes unfair as, although Johnson, in many ways, 
is a product of his heritage, Goldman focuses on the negative connotations of being a 
Texan. This was also something that Johnson struggled with personally; his Texan roots did 
in fact colour the public opinion of Johnson and he knew that it would be something he would 
have to overcome. The fact that Goldman also draws on this is an example of how much this 
issue really did affect his Presidency and the challenge Johnson faced of gaining the trust of 
his peers and the people of America.  
Goldman’s views hold a great deal of credibility in the context of looking at this literature as 
an account of the truth in the sense that he had first-hand experience with the President and 
his policies, not to mention the political consensus of the time. However, his view of the 
Presidency is limited. Goldman wrote the book in 1968, this gives a very short time to really 
asses the outcome of the Presidency; therefore, Goldman is purely relying on the immediate 
impact of Johnson’s policies. Now, the political, economic and social situation can be 
assessed with a wider and more informed perspective. With this in mind, it is important to 
assess whether Goldman would judge Johnson as critically if he had been aware of the true 
impact of the social policy that Johnson passed, for example, Civil Rights, Immigration, 
Environmental, Health Care and Education. Another factor that detracts from Goldman’s 
credibility as a scholarly writer is the lack of debate and evidence that is so essential to a 
scholarly piece of literature. While the source is not without any evidence or debate, (as the 
author himself is providing the evidence with his experience) in comparison to the secondary 
literature, the format is very different in that there is much more human emotion involved and 
therefore it is very clear to the reader that the source is not without its flaws and must be 
read with this in mind.  
While it is important to gather insight from these literary sources, as limited in numbers as 
they are, it is also imperative that we consistently reassess the information that is being 
presented. The information in these sources not only give us a window into the life of those 
who worked with and knew Johnson personally, it also give an in depth account of the 
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consensus of the time. However, it is apparent, as the second section of this literature review 
will show, that the subsequent literature that has emanated from the primary literature has 
yet to present a more alternative view of the presidency and the affects that it has on 
American society today. The number of primary literary sources of the Johnson Presidency 
is limited. The secondary literature is much more abundant and it is possible that this has 
contributed to the literary cannon in a much more dramatic way than the primary literature.  
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Secondary Literature 
 
John Morton Blum, a historian teaching at Yale and writing throughout the 50s and 60s wrote 
The Imperial President; Lyndon Johnson and the Uncertain Legacy. Morton Blum and 
Goldman’s style of writing are, for the most part. quite dissimilar. Morton Blum’s objective 
stance does give more credibility to his writing as it displays a more in-depth and scholarly 
debate however Goldman’s first-hand experience working with the President allows for a 
more detailed view of the President himself. Either way, both books come to roughly the 
same conclusion. Johnson cannot be remembered for the socially innovative policies due to 
his leadership style and the disastrous decisions that were made whilst dealing with the 
Vietnam War. This raises the question of whether Johnson’s Presidency is really being 
assessed to the full extent, and not only being judged on its negative points due to the 
slightly lower level of objectivity shown in the conclusions of Morton Blum’s book.  
While Morton Blum does take into account some positive aspects of Johnson’s social policy, 
like many others, he does not show the extent of the policies or the wide range of policies 
and mainly focuses on the poverty bills and Civil Rights legislation. The approach taken by 
John Morton Blum from the outset is mostly in references to Johnson’s brutish way of getting 
what he wants. Morton Blum’s book also addresses the growth of central government under 
Johnson and his apparent need for power, claiming that ‘Johnson was creating a personal 
leviathan beyond any man’s ability to manage’ (Morton Blum, 1982, pg.178). This statement 
says a lot about how Morton Blum really views Johnson as a president; progressive in his 
policies but spoilt by his tendencies to be power hungry and belligerent. Another key quote 
from the book shows how Johnson himself believed he would be remembered for his 
attempts at socially innovative policies, ‘“Deep down”, he said, “I knew… that the American 
people loved me.”  After all he had done for them, he asked, how could they help but love 
him’…  ‘Alas there were those around him who shared this sad fantasy’ (Morton Blum, 1982, 
pg. 202). This suggests that in Blum’s view, Johnson could not be remembered for his social 
policies as the Vietnam War and his need for power over those who worked around him had 
overshadowed everything good he had tried to do, and that it was merely a fantasy that this 
outcome had not been of his own making. The language used here is potent and would no 
doubt stick in the readers mind; ‘sad fantasy’ suggests that under no circumstances is it 
plausible to remember Johnson for his efforts in passing social policy. The inclusion of this 
quote is also in keeping with the idea that Johnson was a tragedy, the quote in many ways 
inspires pity for Johnson and the theme of ‘tragedy’ is only emphasised by Morton Blum’s 
‘sad fantasy’ comment.  
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Alonzo L. Hamby, a professor of History at the University of Ohio who has written 
extensively on the subject of American History, in particular on The New Deal. It is not clear 
that Hamby had any direct contact with the President. However, due to the time that this 
book was written, it is an example of the opinions that were formed on Johnson by those 
who understood the intricacies of government, and experienced it through the perspective of 
an educated professional. Again, the credentials of the author along with the scholarly format 
of the literature are working to give credibility to the source.  
Hamby describes in the preface of his book that he makes no claim to the ‘truth’, he also 
claims that the book is not an ‘encyclopaedic recitation of events with no apparent direction 
or purpose other than a negative goal’ (Hamby, 1976, pg.vii). Hamby also addressed the 
issue’s that are raised in this paper.  
‘Any memory is fallible, and collective memory is especially open to dispute. 
Nations and groups attempting to employ the past for their own purposes arrive at 
dramatically opposed views of the same episode or problem. Academicians, 
presumably capable of greater objectivity, hurl conflicting interpretations at one 
another with an abandon that must bewilder laymen who come into contact with the 
world of scholarship. A welter of tangled events and uncertain facts, history yields 
few self-evident guides to the future’ (Hamby, 1976, pg. vii).  
Hamby is able to portray Johnson, for the most part, with a fair evaluation. This is most likely 
a product of his position as a historian rather than someone with ties to the President. 
However, there are still elements of his evaluation that are subject to the same psychological 
and personality analysis that is so overwhelming in the biographies of those who did work 
with him or knew him, rather than the overall outcome of his time in office.  
 It is also important to take into account when this book was written. 1976 was still a time 
when the LBJ presidency is fresh in the minds of the American people, and the aftermath of 
the war in Vietnam is all too obvious in American society, not to mention the Nixon 
Administration having an adverse effect on the role of the Executive in the minds of many 
Americans. Arguably, it is a time in which the real legacy of the Civil Rights Act has yet come 
to fulfil its potential as the implications of the legislation were not quite as apparent as they 
are today with America’s first black President in office. Therefore, even though Hamby is 
conscious of the narratives that can be created by the academic accounts of history, he is 
unable to fully assess the true success of the President with such little time between the 
writing of this book and the actual time period in question. In the opening paragraph of 
Hamby’s account of LBJ, he describes how ‘Johnson would lead America through an era of 
frenetic activity and bitter controversy, lifting the nation out of the despair of the Kennedy 
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assassination only to leave it in a mood of even deeper despair.  His ambitions were vast, 
his vanity overweening; the result was a record of major achievement and enormous failure’ 
(Hamby, 1976, pg. 299). Although Hamby is recognising the achievements of Johnson, the 
language he uses is very telling. It is clear that Hamby is stressing the failures of Johnson 
rather than the successes, with terms such as ‘deeper despair’ and ‘enormous failure’. 
Hamby then goes on to discuss Johnson’s time as Senate Majority Leader, stating; 
‘Johnson’s control of the upper chamber was never absolute, but few men in American 
history were more powerful legislators’ (Hamby, 1976, pg.300). ‘The Economic Opportunity 
Act of 1964 was a milestone in the history of social legislation’…‘it was the most ambitious 
example of welfare liberalism to clear Congress since the New Deal; yet it has been rushed 
through with surprising rapidity and remarkably little debate. The achievement was 
testimonial to Johnson’s legislative skill, but allowed little time for intelligent debate, careful, 
analysis or sober second thoughts’ (Hamby, 1976, pg. 305). Here we can see clear 
examples of how the language in in Hamby’s book is emphasising the negative themes. 
Hamby’s conclusion is again an example of swaying opinion by the use of unbalanced 
language when assessing good versus bad aspects of Johnson’s time in office. Hamby’s 
concluding sentence is a brilliant example of over emphasis on the negative aspects of the 
Johnson Presidency through the use of dramatic language, while ostensibly letting the 
reader make up their own mind. ‘It was the record of enormous historical personality 
overcome in the end by the boundlessness of his aspirations and his ego, but able, one 
hoped, to spend his final years taking solace in the knowledge that the good he has done 
would outlive the evil he had unleashed’ (Hamby, 1976, pg 328).  
 
David Mervin, author of The Presidents of the United States writes a brief overview of his 
interpretation of the Johnson Presidency, titled ‘The Tragedy of Lyndon Johnson, 
presumably influenced by and in reference to Goldman’s book; The Tragedy of Lyndon 
Johnson. Mervin often makes reference to Goldman and the conversations that Goldman 
himself recounts in his book. This is representative of the way in which primary literature is 
reflected in the working of scholars and historians who did not know Johnson personally but 
have an understanding of the time period and therefore use the literature of those who did 
know him, to give credibility to their writing.  
 
In examining Johnson in terms of social policy, Mervin merely recounts the struggle between 
congress and the executive in his attempts to raise money for Great Society programs, the 
programs themselves and the impact they had on America are left out of this analysis. When 
Mervin makes further reference to Johnson’s social policy it is at the very end of his 
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conclusive thoughts on the President. Mervin writes, ‘Once he had reached that peak, 
President Johnson sought to use the power he had gained to change the world. On the 
international scene, his efforts were tragically counterproductive whereas his record at 
home, while uneven, was at least partially successful’ (Mervin, 1993, pg. 192). Mervin 
concludes his evaluation of the President with ‘Why did the Johnson Presidency end so 
disastrously? To a large extent the explanation lies in his pursuit of misguided and ill-
founded policy in South East Asia’…‘If other leaders shared the decision to escalate, it was 
the President who decided, against the advice of several senior colleagues, to do so by 
stealth, without taking the people or Congress into his confidence’ (Mervin, 1993, pg. 186). 
The first paragraph of this conclusion is quite damning for Johnson’s reputation. The claim 
that he in no way included the people or Congress in his decision to further involve America 
in the war in South East Asia could be strongly contested, however it is the view that this 
author has chosen to portray.  
 
Mervin’s portrait of Johnson can be described as somewhat one sided when taking into 
account the scope of the assessment. However, Mervin was not a presidential aide or 
politician, he did not know Johnson personally or work for him. When taking account of 
Mervin’s reference list, it is the same authors in the first section of this literature review that 
feature most prominently, in particular Eric Goldman. This is significant as it underlines the 
issue of the perpetuation of historical discourse. The account that Mervin has given of 
Johnson is not one of his own experience, but it is the amalgamation of the information 
learned from the existing literature that was written in the early days after the Johnson 
Presidency. Although Mervin is able to take a much more calm approach to the story of 
Johnson’s time in office, it is clearly influenced by the primary literature on the subject.  
 
One of the most controversial and damning account of the Johnson Presidency is The Dark 
Side of Lyndon Baines Johnson by Joachim Joesten. The book was originally published in 
the UK as the subject matter was deemed too controversial for the US market. Published in 
1968 the book predates most primary literature on the President therefore it is in no way 
influenced by the primary literature in question but instead relies on oral histories, some 
documentation and primarily the stories of those who might, or might not have been involved 
in the events described. The Dark Side of Lyndon Baines Johnson is predominantly a book 
of conspiracy theories, some of them very believable and now, deemed to be a likely series 
of events, e.g. the 1948 stolen election against Coke Stevenson (Joesten, 1968). However, 
some content of the book is, arguably, overreaching. For example, as the book went to 
press, the Democratic National Convention was still a few weeks away, Joesten, at this point 
is convinced that Johnson’s step down from the presidential race is a rouse, and of course 
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he will not relinquish his power that easily. ‘But I, for one, do not believe that the man will 
relinquish power of his own free will. Not the supreme power he grabbed so ruthlessly from 
the man who held it by the will of the people. I have a hunch, let us say, that at the critical 
moment Johnson will jump back into the race and will accept – oh, ever so reluctantly, of 
course – the draft which his henchmen are already busy preparing. And the trick may well 
work (Joesten,1968, pg 386). Joesten had a successful publishing career and wrote many 
books on the subject of conspiracy, predominantly surrounding the Kennedy assassination, 
however when arriving back from a research trip in Dallas, Joesten’s wife described him as 
‘on the verge of a nervous breakdown’ (Simpkin, 1997). Joesten’s book largely amounts to a 
string of quotes, each one wilder and more controversial than the next; the conclusion of 
Joesten’s book reads: 
 
‘But Lyndon B. Johnson’s time is running out, and, unless he stages as last- 
minute coup d’etat, one that will do away with the Constitution itself, he is inextricably 
doomed’… ‘If Lyndon B. Johnson has any brains left, he’ll blow them out before the 
law gets around to him. That way he could at least escape he pinnacle of infamy and 
save his country from foundering in an abyss of national shame’ (Garrison, cited by 
Joesten, pg. 384-385, 1968).  
 
The statements being made here are, in most cases, extreme, i.e. ‘do away with the 
Constitution’, and ‘If Lyndon Johnson has any brains left, he’ll blow them out’. Joesten’s 
whole outlook on Johnson is extreme. Due to the sensationalist theme of the book, and in 
most cases the lack of any real evidence, it is a narrative that is hard to give credibility. The 
book was not published in America until many years after the presidency. This inspires 
conflicting ideas of why that might be through the perspective of the audience. It could have 
been because, as already mentioned, the book lacks any real credibility, or it could be that 
there was something to hide and no publisher would take that risk. While the lack of 
credibility coupled with the highly controversial tone of the book is a more likely reason for 
any publisher in the US not to touch it, many would believe the latter.  
 
Joesten’s book does not address Johnson’s policy as a president, only corruption and greed 
within the American government, in many, many ways it is very dissimilar to most literature 
on Johnson, however, Joesten does drawn on one aspect of Lyndon Johnson that many 
other do, especially Goldman. Johnson Texan roots are again the source of much debate, 
especially in chapter 9, ‘Texas Billie’. Joesten writes; ‘LONG, long ago, Texas was the land 
of enterprising pioneers and derring-do cowboys. Then it became the private preserve of the 
greediest and most ruthless type of oilmen in the world. And, in the wake of the great oil 
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boom, Texas produced a new human species known as the wheeler- dealer’ (Joesten, 1968, 
pg. 107). Joesten then goes on to define ‘a wheeler-dealer’ ‘The hallmark of the authentic 
wheeler-dealer is his ability to amass a multimillion dollar fortune in a minimum of time 
without ever doing anything flagrantly illegal, or at any rate, without ever getting on the 
wrong side of the law’ (Joesten, 1968, pg 108). Firstly, this is a broad definition; secondly, to 
amass this sort of behaviour to Texas alone is very much a generalisation. Of course 
Joesten goes on to place Johnson in this category, which may be a fair estimation, but it is 
the implication that this behaviour is down to him being a Texan  that places Joesten in the 
same school of thought as Goldman  and those who could not overcome the air of mistrust 
surrounding a Texan National Politician.  
 
To sum up, to say that Joesten’s account of Johnson is critical, is an understatement. While 
the book was not published in the US for some time, it was published in the UK in 1968, 
giving the reader and image of Johnson that is both shocking and damning. Coupled with the 
reports of the on-going war in Vietnam, the image being created of Johnson throughout this 
time period would not have been the basis for the legacy of greatness that Johnson had 
always dreamed of. While Joesten never worked with Johnson or even knew him personally, 
he had already established himself as an author on the topic. Having an already successful 
publishing career gives Joesten an air of credibility; The Dark Side of Lyndon Baines 
Johnson being one of his last books, it is clear that Joesten has little concern for ensuring 
that this book is rational enough to be published in the States. Joesten’s final remarks on the 
president are that Johnson has ‘failed miserably as a warlord’ (Joesten, 1968, pg 387). In 
light of more recent literature on the Vietnam war, and evaluating Johnson’s role in the war 
along-side the actions of his advisors, previous administrations and the implications of 
withstanding foreign policy it is arguably safe to say that failed ‘warlord’ is an exaggerated 
evaluation of Johnson’s time in office. While many would be very taken by the conspiracy 
themes in the book, and many of Joesten claims may hold a great deal of credibility, it is 
hard for the reader to accept this as a very credible source due to these seemingly 
outlandish and poorly proven claims.  
 
In stark contrast to (but still by no means sympathetic) Joesten’s book is The Power of the 
Modern Presidency by Prof Erwin C. Hargrove. The book was written in 1974 in light of the 
crisis of the role of the Executive within American government. The book focuses on the role 
of Johnson and Nixon in the creation of this crisis. The book explores various models of 
Presidency, for example The Heroic Presidency Model and Hamiltonian Presidency’ 
(Hargrove, 1974) in relation to the presidencies of Johnson and Nixon, he also compares the 
two presidencies with others such as FDR, JFK and Truman. Hargrove, again, never worked 
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directly with Johnson and takes most of his information from those who did, some of the 
books in Hargrove’s reference list are those written by Goldman, Barry Goldwater and 
Joseph Califano.  Hargrove is particularly fixated on the role of presidential personality and 
how that has affected the role of the Executive. In doing this, Hargrove analyses this aspect 
of Johnson’s presidency more than any other, creating a limited view of his time in office.  
 
Firstly, Hargrove uses the Johnson Presidency as a case study to exemplify the erosion of 
the Heroic Model of the Presidency. Within this analysis is an overview of the Great Society 
in which Hargrove states; ‘President Johnson and his aides were more interested in 
legislative victories than in program implementation. The competition of politics drives a 
President to define achievement as a good legislative box score with Congress, (Hargrove, 
pg 23, 1974). Hargrove explains that this was one of the reasons for some of the social 
policies that Johnson put in place were not successful as they were rushed through 
Congress too quickly for their flaws to be highlighted. Again the haste in which Johnson’s 
social policies were rushed through is a product of Johnson’s need to be a successful and 
great leader in the eyes of Hargrove. When discussing Vietnam, Hargrove follows a similar 
theme of presidential personality as a cause for the demise of the Heroic Model. Hargrove 
uses language that is suggestive of a monarchical role within the presidency; ‘People began 
to talk about the need for Congress to regain possession of some of its abdicated authority 
in foreign affairs’ (Hargrove, 1974, pg 22). The use of the word ‘abdicated’ is suggestive of a 
new monarchical authority. Hargrove again chastises Johnson’s leadership style and 
persona by describing his direction of the war as ‘high handed and as secretive as possible’ 
(Hargrove, 1974, pg22). When directly addressing the issue of personality, Hargrove 
describes Johnson as;  
  
‘Lyndon Johnson was a problem in and of himself. He was far too openly and 
nakedly a man of power to be able to establish a rapport with the American people. A 
man of genuine idealism, he was his own worst enemy because of a compulsive 
insecurity that caused him to continually take defensive position against criticism and 
an offensive position toward associates and friends’… ‘Other great Presidents of this 
century shared a psychological need for personal power and developed a skill of 
power manipulation out of such a need. However the two Roosevelts and Wilson 
were able to disguise their liking for power under the veneer of aristocratic public 
personalities (Hargrove, 1974, pg 25). 
 
Throughout the chapter Hargrove enforces the issue of personality as a key factor in the 
erosion of the Heroic Model and indeed the demise of the President as an upstanding public 
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figure. In a later chapter, Hargrove also suggests that Johnson’s flawed personality was 
linked to his skill as a legislator.  
 
‘In the heyday of Lyndon Johnson this writer developed the thesis that 
personal insecurity and political skill were linked. The creative politician insecurity 
and political skill were linked. The creative politician was depicted as the man who 
required attention and needed to dominate and therefore had developed skills of self-
dramatization and persuasion that would serve those needs’ (Hargrove, 1974, pg 
34).  
 
While Johnson’s skill as a legislator is being acknowledged, Hargrove is suggesting that 
there is little positive outcome for the presidency regardless. For Hargrove, Johnson’s 
personality is his defining feature as a President, causing him to lead a ruinous war and 
push through a number of unsuccessful social policy bills, all the while damaging the image 
of the Executive with his apparent need for personal power, adding; 
 
‘These character flaws would probably not have damaged Johnson’s 
Presidency seriously had it not been for Vietnam. He would have been an unloved 
but respected President of great domestic achievement admired for his political skill. 
But this would have been a Johnson operating in a field of pluralistic, domestic, 
political constraints. In the Vietnam arena he could impose his will on the 
government, though not on the society or even on reality, and in the absence of 
constraints he fell back on the urge to dominate, which when fed by his insecurity in 
the face of criticism eventually destroyed him’ (Hargrove, 1974, pg 40).  
 
 
Hargrove’s account of Johnson is one that is strongly influenced by his personality and what 
affect this has had on the overall perception of the President himself, and ultimately, how this 
has affected the dynamics of the Presidency within the American governmental system. 
Again, the book was written not long after the Johnson Presidency and is a scholarly 
evaluation of the apparent crisis of the time, ‘Imperial Presidency’ (Schlesinger, 2004). The 
book is a clear example of the discourse that has been developed throughout the years and 
shows how personality and psychology have become the main focus of the Johnson 
Presidency. By looking at the reference list it is apparent that Hargrove has used the insight 
of those who worked with Johnson, such as Goldman. Also, by looking at the date of 
publication, it is apparent that Hargrove has been able to rely on his own perception of the 
President, even if it is not a first-hand account.   
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In conclusion, the secondary literature on the Johnson Presidency is, in many ways, more 
extensive and significantly more scholarly than the primary literature. This is mainly due to 
the nature of the primary literature being more narrative and written from personal memory. 
The secondary literature, on the other hand, is using the Johnson presidency, for the most 
part, as a way of testing a hypothesis or creating historiographical timelines in which we are 
able to learn from or use in a social science capacity. However, this is where the issue of 
perpetuating a narrative is established. By taking account of the more personal accounts of 
Johnson in scholarly work, these opinions and biased accounts of Johnson are taken as the 
most likely account on the truth, when, it is not always the case or there are substantial 
gaps. Another aspect of the literature on Johnson, as a whole, is that the focus of the 
literature is far too limited in scope. This is most apparent when the author is assessing the 
social policy of Johnson. The primary focus of these authors is the subject of legislation and 
how quickly and under what circumstances Johnson was able to get the bills through 
Congress, there is also a clear concentration on poverty bills, which is again limited as the 
Great Society was not only primarily focused on this. One cause of this limited view could be 
the very concentrated time period in which most of the literature was written, most of the 
writing on Johnson, not accounting for the literature on Vietnam, was published in the late 
1960s and 70s, in some cases the early 80s. This is significant as Johnson’s actions in the 
social area have had a profound effect on American Society today and the literature that has 
been developed throughout this time period could be described as reactionary to the 
discontent that was rife in America as a result of the war, the damaged role of the Executive 
and the general feeling of unrest in America at the time.  
 
When assessing the literature overall, it is clear that the secondary literature is where we can 
see the hegemonic discourse developing. The predominant themes of personality and power 
are clear throughout and it is clear that most have recycled by the concept of the LBJ 
‘tragedy’. It is understandable that these themes have emerged as they are discussion 
points that peak interest and as previously mentioned, most of this literature is a product of 
its time. The literature review section of this thesis has allowed us to test the first part of the 
hypothesis which is that a hegemonic discourse has developed. The evidence here shows 
that, indeed, there are central themes that runs throughout this literature and create a 
discourse that is not altogether thorough in its analysis and that the popularity of these 
themes has allowed for perpetuation of the narrative. The archival section of this thesis will 
show that the existing literature can be challenged by way of showing that there is much 
more to the Johnson Presidency than is made clear throughout the literature. The legacy of 
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Johnson is significantly influenced by the existing literature and therefore it is important to 
present a more informed analysis. 
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Archival Research 
 
The biographical work on Johnson clearly demonstrates the recurrence of certain themes; 
the subject of Vietnam and the interest in his persona and method as a politician have 
become the main topic of discussion when assessing the Johnson Presidency. Although 
there are instances of praise for the social policies he put in place, they are often fleeting 
and in many cases followed by more grounding points, bringing the legacy back to the 
Vietnam War, a failing 70s economy, or their interpretation of his personality or mental state. 
Within the biographies and various accounts of the Johnson administration, the Great 
Society is not left unreported, it is analysed and debated to a large extent. On the other 
hand, when looking at the archival resources and in particular the administrative histories of 
the Johnson Presidency, it is apparent that some major aspects of these policies are under 
emphasised and therefore the picture created of Johnson, mainly in terms of his domestic 
and social policy, lack the detail that is essential in understanding what the Great Society 
programs actually did, and more importantly, what Johnson intended The Great Society to 
be. The Great Society did not just encompass Johnson’s drive and ambition to educate the 
poor and raise living standards for all ethnicities; it was a new way of living for Americans 
across the nation, a way of preserving America both environmentally and culturally.  
 
“The Challenge of the next half century ,” Johnson said “is whether we have 
the wisdom to use that wealth to enrich and elevate our national life,” to prevent “old 
values” from being “buried under unbridled growth.” A rising Gross National Product 
and full employment would not by themselves create a civilisation “where leisure is a 
welcome chance to build and reflect, not feared cause of boredom and 
restlessness… where the city of man serves not only the needs of the body and the 
demands of commerce but the desire for beauty and the hunger for 
community…Where men are more concerned with the quality of their goals than the 
quantity of their goods… where the demands of morality, and the needs of the spirit, 
can be realized in the life of the nation”’ (Kearns Goodwin, 1976, 210-211).   
 
 
This section of the paper aims to bring back into focus some of the aspects of the presidency 
that are not discussed in the biographical sources on Johnson.  The archival research will 
36 
 
mainly address aspects of social policy that are, for the most part, missing from the popular 
concept of Johnson’s legacy, such as environmental policy and immigration. It will also 
address issues such as Civil Rights and War on Poverty with a more detailed look at how 
these programs and acts were able to come into fruition and the successes and rewards the 
Johnson administration enjoyed and can still take credit for today.  
 
While Johnson served as principal and teacher at Welhausen School in Cotulla, Texas, 
Johnson worked closely with the impoverished immigrant children and gained a deep 
understanding of what it meant to be poor in America. Although Johnson liked to make out 
he had a much more humble upbringing than he actually did, he did know poverty, he knew 
it from his time at Welhausen and this because the catalyst for the War on Poverty 
(Goldman, 1969) (Kearns Goodwin, 1976). In a visit to Cortulla in 1966 Johnson explains the 
origins of his war on poverty.  
‘Mayor Cotulla, my friend Dan Garcia, all of my former students, boys and girls: 
I have come back to Cotulla this afternoon, not just because this school is part of my 
past, but because this school is a part of America's future. 
Everything I want to work for, as your President, to achieve peace, to conquer 
poverty, to build a worthy civilization--all of these depend in a very large degree on 
what happens in this school and what happens in other schools throughout our land. 
Thirty-eight years ago I came to Cotulla. I was still a student myself. I was working 
my way through the San Marcos Teachers College. 
In those days, neither America nor her schools shared any abundance. We had only 
five teachers here in the Welhausen public school. We had no lunch facilities. We 
had no school buses. We had very little money for educating people of this 
community. We did not have money to buy our playground equipment, our 
volleyballs, our softball bat. I took my first month's salary and invested in those things 
for my children. 
About the only thing we had an ample supply of was determination--determination to 
see it through’ (Johnson, 1966). 
Johnson’s social policy did not just extend to poverty, the Civil Rights movement was well 
underway when Johnson became president and the Civil Rights Act was well overdue. Jack 
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Valenti, one of Johnson’s most trusted aides describes how Johnson had planned his 
assault on the bill on the first evening he became president in his book The Very Human 
President. Valenti takes a much more sympathetic view of Johnson, This could be down to 
the fact that Valenti and Johnson remained friends and therefore wanted to paint a rose 
tinted picture of the President. Valenti describes Johnson’s thoughts on the Civil Rights bill; 
‘He talked about civil rights. He had disagreed with the Kennedy approach 
and had so advised JFK by memorandum. He believed, as he wrote JFK, that the 
president should take civil rights to the people, over the heads of the Congress, and 
take it to the country as a moral crusade flattening all opposition with the sharp edge 
of principle and moral righteousness. He had prophesised the civil rights legislation 
would bog down, led into quicksand by the crafty parliamentary-wise southern 
Senate patriarchs, unless special and visibly muscular effort were put forth. Now he 
was in the captain’s chair and he spoke almost eagerly about his commitment to get 
civil rights off its backside’ (Valenti, 1976, pg. 119) 
Valenti takes a very personal approach to the legacy of LBJ, as a trusted aid of the president 
he saw the inner workings of the office and often had dinner with the president and his wife 
even after Valenti had finished working for him. This gives Valenti an insight into LBJ’s mood 
and even how Johnson, himself, perceived his presidency. Valenti gives the reader an 
insight into LBJ’s past and how his previous posts influenced his compassion and urge to 
help those who needed it most. Valenti describes how his experience teaching young 
Mexican- American children at a school in south Texas imprinted on him to such an extent 
he would never forget it. He describes how ‘One cannot grow up on the land in Texas, soil 
that grudgingly gave up a living to those who inhabited it, and not be affected by the ebb and 
flow of the quality of life. Rain, grass, weather because enormously important’. (Valenti, 
1976, pg. 9) This is the closest reference in most existing literature to the motives behind 
Johnson’s extensive environmental policies and how Johnson was always connected to the 
land he grew up on and therefore could sympathise with the people who were still trying to 
eke out a living in the hill country. While the literature on the social policies of President 
Johnson covers many issues and gives detailed accounts of the varied policies enacted by 
LBJ and his administration, some of the policies that are paramount to understand Johnson 
as a person and president are not analysed. Johnson, along with his wife Lady Bird, were 
keen bring about many environmental bills to ensure the sustainability of their country and 
also to preserve beauty for generations to come. In the literature explored here, Johnson’s 
success with this type of legislation is not discussed, neither is the reasoning behind it, other 
than by Jack Valenti when describing Johnson’s connection to Texas land and people. 
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In 1964 Johnson made a speech in which he explained the importance of declaring war on a 
domestic enemy. Johnson explained: 
‘On similar occasions in the past we have often been called upon to wage war 
against foreign enemies which threatened our freedom. Today we are asked to 
declare war on a domestic enemy which threatens the strength of our nation and the 
welfare of our people. If we now move forward against this enemy, if we can bring to 
the challenges of peace the same determination and strength which has brought us 
victory in war, then this day and this Congress will have won a secure and 
honourable place in the history of the nation and the enduring gratitude of 
generations of Americans yet to come.’(Johnson, 1964) 
Johnson’s determination is clear here, the ferocity in which he addresses the need for 
progression in social policy is a clear sign of Johnson’s commitment to the cause, the 
language used, while reflective of the foreign policy at the time, is in some ways overbearing 
and extremely militant. However it is key to the legacy of his presidency, Johnson’s skill and 
power as a legislator is fundamental when assessing the Johnson presidency. It is the 
driving power behind the successful passing of the Civil Rights bill, immigration reform, 
environmental policy and the numerous social policy bills that were headed under the War 
on Poverty.  
While it is apparent that a lot of the legislation signed by Johnson and implemented during 
the Johnson Administration started life in some way as a Kennedy policy, the way in which 
Johnson was able to use the martyred president to bring his policies to fruition was a stroke 
of genius. Not only this but Johnson experience as Senate Majority Leader, his southern 
roots, his Southern ‘oil men’ friends and his overbearing personality meant that he was a 
force to be reckoned with. He was a president who was able to persuade, some may say 
bully, and cajole people into doing what he wanted. As unethical as that may be, it worked. 
The only other legislative package ever to be passed through Congress at the speed the 
Great Society package was is FDR’s New Deal package (McKay, 2009).  
The table below shows the number of presidential vetoes and how many times they are 
overridden by Congress, from Roosevelt to George W. Bush. The table shows that 
throughout the Johnson Administrations there are no major presidential vetoes made. This 
was not the case for many other presidents both before and after Johnson. For example, 
Nixon and Ford used their Presidential Veto to a large extent and were often overruled by a 
two thirds majority in both the Senate and the House of Representatives. Ford used the 
Presidential Veto for major bills 11 times, with an average of 4.4 major vetoes per year in 
office, 7 of which were overruled. The only other president not to use his presidential veto 
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was Kennedy. Both Kennedy and Johnson were working with a predominantly Democratic 
Congress, this could be significant when assessing why they did need to make any major 
vetoes. However, Kennedy did not manage to pass his New Frontier legislative package; he 
was also unable to pass the Civil Rights bill.  
 
Table 1, Table to Show Major Bills Vetoed 1933-2008 (McKay, 2009, pg.241)  
President Total Number 
involving 
appropriations 
Number 
involving 
foreign and 
foreign 
economic 
policy 
Major Vetoes 
per year in 
office 
Number 
overridden  
Roosevelt 2 0 0 0.16 2 
Truman 6 0 0 0.8 5 
Eisenhower 2 2 0 0.25 1 
Kennedy 0 0 0 0 0 
Johnson 0 0 0 0 0 
Nixon 13 10 1 2.4 4 
Ford 11 10 1 4.4 7 
Carter 5 2 2 1.3 1 
Reagan 15 7 5 1.9 5 
Bush Senior 15 4 5 3.7 1 
Clinton 19 10 4.2 2.5 2 
G.W. Bush 7 1 3 1.15 2 
 
The most extensive source on the War on Poverty lies in the Lyndon B Johnson Presidential 
Library in Austin, Texas in the form of the Office of Economic Opportunity Administrative 
Histories by Bertrand M. Harding, Acting Director of the Office of Equal Opportunity. The 
document extensively recollects the chronology of the OEO and the problems it faced, along 
with the successes it enjoyed. The document begins; 
 
‘This record of genesis, the events and the personalities of the War on 
Poverty, is an honest attempt to see the first five years of this infant effort with clarity 
and integrity. The warts and the blemishes are there; the frustrations as well—as well 
as the victories and the justifications. Never before has a major nation attempted 
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such a feat. To put an end to poverty of the minority, at a time when the majority 
were enjoying their greatest prosperity’ (LBJPL: 001, 1969, pg. 1). 
 
The OEO brought with it extensive change to the HEW as well as changing the lives of many 
undereducated and under privileged Americans, young and old. An interview with Robert 
Perrin, who joined the OEO in 1966, describes some of the OEO’s achievements.  
 
‘The hardest impact to pinpoint is the actual emergence of people from 
poverty. Now, we can only assume that the accelerated rate at which this has been 
taking place must be due to the kinds of emphasis on the programs for the poor that 
the OEO has been spearheading.’… ‘We will justly take credit for that, particularly in 
the rate with which the non-whites have been coming out of poverty’… ‘Certainly the 
impact on communities is without question. We’ve had mayors tell us that if they 
didn’t have the community action agencies, they’d have to invent them, because they 
have to have a means of expressing, of listening to the voice of the people, which 
they never had before.’  (Perrin, 2010, pg. 411) 
This interview shows a fraction of the success that the OEO and War on Poverty had on the 
poor. Here Robert Perrin describes how the programs have an effect on the community as a 
whole as well as helping non-white Americans rise up out of poverty. However, this sort of 
account of success is predominantly left out of the literature surrounding Johnson’s 
presidency with many scholars only focusing on Johnson’s failure to actually see out his 
mission of ending poverty in America. Johnson declared war on poverty on the 8th of January 
1964. The term War on Poverty was the banner for the numerous bills and legislation 
brought in by Johnson in an aim to overcome the 19% poverty rate. (Gillette, 2010) When 
looking at Johnson’s domestic policy it is very easy to slip into the Orthodox mind frame. 
Much of the literature on the Johnson’s domestic policy describes the ambitious policies and 
millions of tax dollars spent on programs and welfare for the poor and while there is credit 
given to some of the policies and the outcome of them, they then also describes how 
Johnson’s attention is taken from his War on Poverty and then focused on the very real war 
in Vietnam and subsequently the struggling economy.  
One of the most crucial elements of Johnson’s War on Poverty is not any particular piece of 
legislation, but the awareness that it created. The hidden world of the poor was a bigger 
issue in 1960s America than many books or biographies acknowledge. Even though some of 
the anti-poverty policies that Johnson established could not be sustained, Johnson still 
succeeded in bringing the issue of poverty into the conscience of the American people. In 
Launching the War on Poverty: An Oral History by Michael Gillette, Gillette describes how in 
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1964 President Lyndon B Johnsons travelled up the side of an Appalachian Mountain to 
seek out a family who symbolised the very epitome of the poverty that ran throughout 
America. The Fletcher family ‘had been “chosen” by the White House to personalise poverty- 
to symbolise the 35 million Americans who in 1964 earned less than $3,000 a year.’ (Gillette, 
2010, pg. xi) Gillette describes how even if the War on Poverty failed, there were significant 
victories. This was because the offensive on poverty demanded the attention of the Media, 
Government and subsequently the American people.  
Gillette describes how the formally invisible problem came to the forefront of people’s minds 
and meant changes were made in all levels of government. Within Gillette’s Oral history, 
there are accounts of the OEO and the work that it did from those who were working within 
it. This book is a good indicator of how the people working in the OEO felt about the work 
that they were doing, and although it is not an unbiased account, it gives both critical and 
sympathetic viewpoints from the people who knew the programs well.  These accounts talk 
about how the success of the OEO does not only reside in the programs themselves and the 
work that they did but also in how it was an implement of reform and how it is very important 
to remember that the formulation of the OEO had a significant effect on how Congress, the 
public and HEW (Department of Health, Education and Welfare) saw certain programs. The 
nature of American government means there is great scepticism when it comes to the 
appropriation of money for welfare. As Gaither states in Gillette’s book; 
OEO played a major role in redirecting the government programs through 
example. When I got there, preschool education was in disfavour in HEW: the federal 
government should not be supporting that. Within a couple of years, preschool 
education was the darling. The office of Education was supporting it, thought it was a 
good thing, though that, indeed, the age level ought to be reduced.’… ‘It is, I think, 
the most successful attempt in terms of redirecting the attention of government that 
we’ve seen in this century.’ (Gaither 2010, pg.412)   
Here Gaither is showing example of how there are more aspects to the social policy of the 
era than first meets the eye, and certainly more than is generally accepted in the orthodox 
view of the Johnson Presidency.  
 ‘I don’t know if I’ll pass a single law, or get one dollar appropriated, but before I’m through, 
no community in America will be able to ignore the poverty in its midst’ (Johnson, 1963) 
Michael Harrington’s short story The Other America describes the unseen poor. Harrington 
describes how the middle classes and the tourist do not see the poor in American as they 
are hidden on the outskirts of society, rarely venturing from their homes into the inner city or 
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affluent suburb.  The cheap manufacturing of clothing adds to this as the poor are hard to 
distinguish from the rest due to the relative low cost of fashionable or acceptable quality 
clothing. Historians such as Maurice Isserman claim that it was the publication of 
Harrington’s book in 1962 that sparked the War on Poverty.  
‘Then, too, beauty and myth are perennial masks of poverty. The traveller 
comes to the Appalachians in the lovely season. He sees the hills, the streams, the 
foliage but not the poor. Or perhaps he looks at a run-down mountain house and, 
remembering] Rousseau rather than seeing with his own eyes, decides that those 
people are truly fortunate to be living the way they are and that they are lucky to be 
exempt from the strains and tensions of the middle class. The only problem is that 
those people, the quaint inhabitants of those hills, are undereducated, 
underprivileged, lack medical care, and are in the process of being forced from the 
land into a life in the cities, where they are misfits’ (Harrington, 1962 pg. 1-4). 
The book written by Harrington was just a small insight into the culture of poverty at the time. 
It was also an example of the growing discontent within the country and emphasised the 
need for social reform, especially when taking into account the poverty levels in the African 
American communities in conjunction with the Civil Rights movement. From 1960, there had 
been some significant changes within the Department for Health, Education and Welfare; 
however it was not until 1963 onwards that the significant changes were made.  
 
In 1960 the HEW celebrated its 25th anniversary, at this point in the establishment of the 
HEW there was 14.3 million people receiving benefits. The annual payments totally to a bill 
of $10.8 billion with an increase of 1,075,000 people joining the social security roll in the due 
to recent amendments. When looking at the history of the HEW and the various 
amendments and new acts that were added, there is a significant change from the end of 
1963 onwards. A noticeable shift took place in the types of programs that are run. There is 
also a noticeable change in how money is appropriated rather than the focus being who the 
money is appropriated too. Rather than programs changing to include different 
demographics they are instead targeting a larger demographic but through educational 
means. An example of this would be The Nurse Training Act of 1964. This act meant that 
money was appropriated to extend existing nursing schools and also build more. It also 
provided a loan to those who were training to be nurses. Another example would be the 
Library Services and Construction Act 1964. This act extended the 1956 Act to increase the 
construction of libraries in urban areas and areas with no or inadequate facilities, including a 
rise in federal spending on public library services and construction, and, of course Job 
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Corps. These programs were no longer targeting a specific demographic for welfare but they 
were indirectly servicing those who would not usually have the means to educate 
themselves or their children. By increasing federal spending on public services, Johnson 
was laying the foundations for educating the poor and therefore increasing their chances of 
employment. This is a crucial shift for the American welfare system from April 1963 onwards 
and one that has gone un-noticed as part of Johnson’s legacy.  
 
Although some of the first changes started to appear within the last months of Kennedy 
administration, the significant policies were not implemented until the Johnson 
administration.  Johnson’s aim throughout his presidency was not to just give money to the 
people who needed it, but to give them the means to earn it themselves. This is a very 
fundamental and age old idea of sustainability but still an idea that seemed to almost elude 
the HEW until the Johnson Administration. 1965 was a particularly significant year for the 
HEW bringing with it two major organisational changes. Firstly, the older Americans Act was 
signed by the president on July 14th. This meant that the administrative department that dealt 
with the welfare of America’s elderly population was raised to agency standard and 
subsequently elevated the importance of care and welfare for the elderly in America. The 
Water Quality Act, signed in October 1965, established the Federal Water Pollution Control 
Administration, again elevating a Public Health Service to agency standard. These 
organisational changes were followed by an astronomical total of 25 major pieces of 
legislation. The legislation passed was the foundation of Johnson’s Great Society and 
tackled a wide range of issues such as education, environment and poverty. (DHEW 
Publication, 1972) 
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Job Corps and the Youth Opportunity Campaign  
 
As part of the War on Poverty, Unemployment was a major battle. To get to the bottom of 
the problem of unemployment, for Johnson, education had to be tackled. Increasing federal 
aid to educational programs was something that would take a great deal of hard work, 
persuasion and power to pass. The opposition to Johnson’s programs came from the 
traditional self-deterministic attitude of America.  
 
‘It’s a huge political Pork Barrel, and a feeding through for welfare industry, 
surrounded by sanctimonious, hypocritical, phoney, moralistic crap… across the 
country, City Halls have their committees on Economic Opportunity to identify what 
they call positive and negative programs and leaders. Positive means you do what 
every City Hall tells you to do and negative means you are subversive, that you think 
for yourself.’ (Alinsky, 1965, Vol. 231, No.1382) 
 
 
 To overcome this type of opposition, Johnson utilised the task forces and studies that had 
not originally been intended for this purpose.  Three days before Johnson gave his State of 
the Union Message to the Labour Department he submitted a report entitled ‘One Third of 
the Nation’ of the task force on Manpower Utilisation. The report was established by 
President Kennedy to evaluate the Selective Service rejection rates. Johnson hoped that the 
evidence of this report could be used to support the Youth Employment proposal by showing 
how dyer the situation was for lower class youths, especial African Americans and most 
importantly, how educating them would not only be beneficial for them and their life style but 
for national security, something that would have been a pressing issue under the weight of 
the Cold War. The task force discovered that close to 750,000 young people dropped out of 
school every year before obtaining a diploma, and that one out of every six dropouts was 
unemployed. Subsequently if this was to continue, ‘One Third of the Nation’ would not be 
eligible to serve in the armed forces due to low IQ levels in the coming years. In urban areas, 
the proportions were even higher, close to 50%. The task force predicted that if the current 
trend continued then in 5 years’ time there would be ‘one and a half million unemployed 
youths—without adequate education or training, without jobs, and without a future’ 
(LBJPL:002, 1964 p.12).  
 
The report was one of the few available data sources that the Task Force could draw from. 
This is a prime example of Johnson’s technique and skill as a legislator. It showed that one 
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third of the country’s 18 year old draftees would not qualify for the armed forces. The study 
showed that these men were the next generation of poor in America, they were born into 
poverty and their children would be born into the same lifestyle. The report explained that the 
poverty within these communities was perpetuated and that something needed to change for 
this cycle to be broken. (LBJPL: 003, 1964) Moynihan wrote ‘The study revealed, for 
example, the disproportionately high rates of Negro failure of the mental test, the great 
importance of family size for all the races, the sharp difference in the rejection rates not only 
among races, but among regions of the nation’ (Moynihan, 1968, Pg.21) In the spirit of self-
determination, cash hand-outs were not the answer here, but investment in education was a 
priority for Johnson and the Office of Equal Opportunity (OEO). 
 
One of the pivotal programs run by the OEO was the Job Corps, an educational program 
that was designed to break the vicious cycle of poverty.  At this time the average amount of 
years that an American labourer had spent in education was 12.2 years which is only slightly 
above the high school level. However, for those who were unemployed long-term the 
average time in education was as low as 10.5 years meaning that around two thirds of the 
long term unemployed did not even finish high school. The Americans who had failed to 
reach the high school diploma standard were twice as likely to be part of the long term 
unemployed population, resulting in the numbers of long term unemployed  Americans 
without a high school diploma being 50% higher than their proportion in the labour force. 
(LBJPL: 004, 1965) 
 
The concept of a Job Corps was not a new concept. There were many attempts to resurrect 
the program since 1942, FDR’s Civilian Conservation Corps, but none succeeded. The old 
conservation corps model had officially died when Hubert Humphrey put forward ‘A Plan to 
save trees, land and boys’ in 1958 and 59. It faced a general lack of Congressional Interest 
and Administration opposition, the two bills failed to pass. In 1960 the Democratic Party, with 
an upcoming election looming, started to put the feelers out for proposals around the subject 
of youth employment. Humphrey’s plan was taken on board and in 1961 he forced the issue 
by submitting his bill on the very first day of the 87th Congress. President Kennedy, David E. 
Bell and the Bureau of the Budget were unconvinced that the Conservations Corps was 
enough to tackle the youth unemployment issue. With this in mind, a small experimental 
Youth Corps was set up. The Corps consisted of 6,000 and ‘on-the-job’ training programs 
were set up for a further 50,000 members. This was combined into the Administration 
substitute Youth Employment Act. Congress rejected Kennedy’s bill, revised the scope of the 
program and the final report bill was killed by the House Rules committee (Sundquist, 1968) 
(LBJPL, 005, 1965). The revised Job Corps was eventually initiated in 1964. The mission of 
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the Job Corps was to supply young people (16-24) with free education and training in order 
to make them more employable.  
 
As Adam Yarmolinsky put it, the Job Corps was ‘offering school dropouts a chance to live, 
learn and work in a completely new environment where they would be prepared for a 
productive role in society’ (LBJPL: 006, 1964, pg. 12) Originally officials of the OEO were 
hoping for a speedy, visible result to demonstrate success of a nationwide strategy to 
increase the earning power and social adaptability of a critical segment of the nation’s 
population (John Bainbridge, 1968). The idea was that by starting with youth it would be 
possible that poverty would be overcome by breaking the poverty cycle and that youth was 
‘the best place for the poverty cycle to be broken’ (LBJPL: 007, 1963-1969 pg. 456). It was 
thought that if they improved health, education, training, welfare and rehabilitation, this would 
in turn prepare them for employment as an adult. However this notion was opposed by the 
Secretary of Labour, W. Willard Wirtz.    
 
 Secretary of Labour W. Willard Wirtz, originally a Kennedy man serving from 1962 to 1969, 
maintained that while conventional techniques were desirable, they would not produce 
results. He said ‘Poverty is, by definition, lack of income and income comes from jobs…’ 
Here Wirtz is emphasising that the priority itself must be creating jobs for rather than just 
training people to be suitable for the jobs available. Johnson took this on board and did so in 
a way that would ensure that those who had been part of his youth training programs would 
be the ones who got the jobs. One of the ways in which Johnson encouraged the 
employment of American youths was the Youth Opportunity Campaign; Johnson looked to 
the federal agencies to find jobs or training opportunities for those who had taken part in 
youth training programs under the Youth Opportunity Campaign. He not only called out to 
the public sector but also to private employers (LBJPL: 008, 1965). On the 3rd of June 1965 
Vice President Humphrey made these comments;  
‘Ten days ago the President announced a nationwide youth opportunity 
campaign to provide job opportunities for the out-of-work young people between the 
ages of 16 and 21. The President asked me to head a task force to implement this 
campaign. I am pleased to report that the response to the President's appeal among 
Federal, State, and local government agencies, private businesses, our unions, and 
non-profit organizations has been most encouraging. And we meet here this 
afternoon to honor those firms and organizations who responded most promptly to 
the youth opportunity campaign.’ (Humphrey, 1965) 
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A training manual was also sent out to all those who Johnson had called out to supply work 
opportunities, both public and private; the manuals aim was to instruct the employers how to 
engage these people in their work. The manual read;  
 
‘This summer the largest group of young people in history have become 
eligible for work. The President has called upon all employers, public and private, to 
provide summer jobs and job training for these young people. He has pointed out the 
need for young people to be able to have jobs and to learn to work if they are to 
become useful members of society. As employers we cannot consider these young 
people as simple a resource for meeting our summer employment needs; we must 
recognise that we are making an investment in the future workforce of the nation’ 
(LBJPL:009, 1965) 
 
The evidence here shows how Johnson was not only interested in the unemployment rate 
going down in national statistics but he was determined that the youth of America were going 
to benefit from these policies, as were their employers. Johnson’s aim was of sustainability 
and of longevity therefore not only must these youths be employed, they needed to stay 
employed. To sustain the employment of youths in America, hiring them needed to be 
mutually beneficial and positive for both employee and employers and therefore training and 
information was provided for the employer. The detail of the program that the training leaflet 
demonstrates is a sign of a dedication to the social policies that were implemented and most 
of all, the longevity of their success. In turn, the evidence shows how Johnson was not 
looking to just demonstrate to the American public that he was merely honouring the 
campaign slogans from the previous year, he was determined make the programs work by 
putting one million youths in work. This sort of attention to detail can also be viewed as a 
counter argument to the authors and historians that claim Johnson’s social policy bills where 
rushed through without thought (Hamby, 1976). The Job Corps, as established by Johnson, 
still exists today serving 60,000 16 to 24 year olds, through 122 centres (Expect More.gov, 
2013).   
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Fair Labour Standards Act 
 
 
Another way that Johnson sought to decrease the poverty rate was to increase the minimum 
wage. In the 1964 State of Union message, Johnson urged that there must be significant 
improvements to the Fair Labour Standard Act; this was also reflected in the President’s 
economic report. The Fair Labour Standards Act and Minimum Wage Act was targeted as an 
area for reform, this was not due to any issues that were inherent in the policy itself, but 
because pervious amendments that had been made in 1961as part of the adoption of major 
amendments, and the various aspects of the act that were present in its conception, had 
limited the acts coverage. Specific exemptions had been made that meant workers who 
would otherwise be covered, were not. Also, the act worked by way of monetary testing 
known as enterprise coverage. Enterprise coverage applied to annual sales and 
engagement of commerce or production of commerce, this method limited the Act even 
further. With these limitations applied to the Act it became fragmented and created inequality 
in regulating against substandard working conditions and payment. Therefore, Johnson 
needed to ensure that the Act was amended to remove the inequalities that had been 
created within it. (LBJPL: 010, 1968) 
 
 An interagency task force was set up to discuss the parameters of the proposed 
amendments of the Fair Labour Standards Act. Within this task force, members of the OEO, 
HEW, Treasury Commerce, Bureau of Budget and the Council of Economic Advisors, 
discussed the proposed plans to extend the coverage of the minimum wage act, in particular 
to hired farm workers, increase minimum wage overall and raise the overtime rate from one 
half to double time. In 1966 the required amendments were made and Johnson approved 
the bill, extending the bill to a further 10 million workers and establishing an overall increase 
in the minimum wage to $1.60 per hour.  (LBJPL: 011, 1968)  
 
The president made these remarks when approving the bill;  
  
 ‘Today in this country, when you are poor, you are poor alone. The new 
minimum wage $64 a week, will not support a very big family, but it will bring workers 
and their families a little bit above the poverty line…My ambition is that no man 
should have to work minimum wage, but that every man should have skills that he 
can sell for more.’(LBJPL: 012, 1968, pg.3)  
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However, even before minimum wage was amended, American families were rising above 
the poverty line; the following evidence is part of a memorandum sent to Johnson from his 
special aid in domestic affairs, Joe Califano.  The data that was collected was from the 
Census Bureau and the Internal Revenue Service. The evidence is an example of the 
significant increase in income levels during the years of the Johnson Administration. 1966 
was the first time in American history that more than half of American Families (54%) had 
income of $7000; Ten years ago 77% of families had income under $7000. In 1963 58% of 
families had incomes under $7000.  The median family income in America reached $7,436 in 
1966, in 1963 the median income was $6,249. This mean that between 1959 and 1966, the 
income of all families had increased by 37% and between 1963 and 1966, the income of all 
families increased 19%. More than 2/3 of this increase is a gain in real purchasing power 
after adjustment for price increase. For non-white families the overall increase in income 
between the years 1959-56 was 59%, 34% of this increase was between the years 1963 and 
1966.In light of this, families living below the poverty line from 1959 to 1966 dropped from 
22% to 15%, a considerable improvement  (LBJPL: 013, 1967). 
 
As well as average income rising, unemployment was going down too. The table below 
(Table 2) shows a small but significant insight into the unemployment rates of civilians over 
the age of 20. The unemployment rate dropped from 5.9 to 5.1 in the space of just 1 year 
between May 1963 and May 1964.  
 
Table 2- Table to show seasonally adjusted rates of employment (LBJPL: 014, 1964 pg.1) 
 
*Man hours lost by the unemployed and those on part time work for economic reasons as a 
per cent of total man hours potentially available to the civilian labour force. 
Selected Unemployment 
Rates  
May 1964 April 1964 March 1964 May 1963 
Total (All Civilian Workers) 5.1 5.4 5.4 5.9 
Men 20 years and over 3.6 3.8 3.9 4.4 
Women 20 years and over 5.0 5.4 5.6 5.4 
Married men (wife present) 2.6 2.9 2.9 3.3 
Experienced wage and 
salary earners 
4.8 5.0 5.1 5.5 
Labour force time lost 
through unemployment or 
part time work* 
5.7 5.9 5.8 6.5 
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In a Memorandum for the President in September 1965, Wirtz describes how recent reports 
show an unprecedented increase in new job opportunities, underscoring the direct 
correlation between education and employment. The statistics of the unemployment show 
that nearly half of the reduction in unemployment took place with those who were 
unemployed for 15 weeks or more. Long term unemployment was reduced by 21% (LBJPL: 
015, 1965, pg.1). For Wirtz, originally sceptical of the education plans Johnson had put in 
place to increase employment; this must have been an astonishing achievement for the 
administration. In a later report from Wirtz to the President, unemployment was still 
decreasing. Unemployment had dropped to 4.0%, the lowest level America had seen since 
early 1957. Unemployment for adult men was down 500,000 from the previous year and the 
unemployment for women was now at its lowest level for 8 years and down 150,000 from 
January 1965. In one year, the unemployment rate for teenagers, the demographic Johnson 
targeted specifically, was down to 12.0% from 15.2%. The unemployment figure for Non-
whites, mainly African Americans, who made up 1/5 of the unemployed population, now 
stood at 7.0% from 9.0% the year previous. (LBJPL: 016, 1966) Wirtz concluded his report 
with a bold and underlined statement that ‘January employment stood at 71.2 million, up 
2.2 million over January 1965 and the highest January employment level in our 
history’ (LBJPL: 017, 1966, pg.1). This was not the only figure to break records during the 
Johnson Administration one example being that the hourly and weekly wages of factory 
workers set an all-time high (LBJPL: 018, 1966). 
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Immigration  
The Civil Rights Movement brought with it a multifaceted debate of equality not just focused 
on voting rights or employment. Immigration was also a very potent issue as the system in 
American at the time was inherently racist. The National Origins Formula was an immigration 
law introduced in 1921 as the Emergency Quota Act. The formula meant that immigration 
into America was limited to meet quotas. These quotas were established on the basis of the 
existing population of a particular ethnicity already in America in 1910. The Act was a 
preventative measure taken to stop unskilled workers entering the country and overall, to 
maintain the ethnic composition of America. In 1924 the Act was amended to include the 
Asian Exclusion Act which flatly banned people of Asian origin from migrating to America, 
completely counter- intuitive to the American premise that all men are created equal. 
 
The changes that were made to immigration policy in 1965 are largely accredited to 
Kennedy’s efforts in 1963 and his work with the Anti-Defamation League during his 
senatorial years, but like many of the Kennedy’s social policies they either received very little 
interest or were not achieved during his short presidency. Kennedy had been an advocate of 
immigration reform for years and wrote ‘A Nation of Immigrants’ in his senatorial years as 
part of the Anti- Defamation League (Kennedy, 1959). As it would be more damaging and 
unfair to immediately change the system as it would be to just leave it as it is, Kennedy 
proposed that each countries immigration quota be reduced by 1/5 every year, for 5 years. 
The quota numbers that would be released would then be collected in a reserve pool where 
the first come, first served basis would be in action. Kennedy also proposed that 50% of this 
reserve pool be used to admit immigrants with special or useful skills and education, another 
30% would be used to admit the unmarried sons and daughters of US citizens who would 
otherwise not be eligible for citizenry. The remaining 20% would be used to admit the 
spouses or children of resident aliens. However, the bill received little if any attention from 
Congress and Kennedy was never able to see his ideas of a new immigration policy come to 
fruition. President Kennedy initially sent Congress a draft bill of the proposed changes and to 
abolish the national quota system. Hearings were held by the Senate immigration and 
neutralisation subcommittee however, no bill was ever reported (Congressional Quarterly, 
1965). 
 
 In July 1964, Johnson began to put pressure on the issue once again and eventually 
hearings were scheduled for immigration reform. The Feighan subcommittee began hearings 
in July (Congressional Quarterly, 1965). While the Bill was subject to a large amount of 
opposition by both congress and the people of America, it was finally passed and the 
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Immigration and Nationality Act was finally signed into law in 1965 by Johnson outside the 
Statue of Liberty. While it could be argued that immigration reform was more down to the 
efforts of JFK and later his brother Ted, it is important to take into account the congressional 
consideration of the Act, the main opposition of immigration reform was from the south. With 
this in mind, and the fact Kennedy had previously tried to instigate immigration reform and 
failed; would Kennedy have ever overcome these obstacles and signed the new immigration 
bill himself? While this question can never be answered for sure, it is only fair to say that 
Johnson’s connections in the south and legislative skill gave him a distinct advantage. 
Johnson made these comments when signing the Act into law;  
 
  ‘Our present law fails in compassion by keeping families apart,  
Our present law fails in justice by choosing immigrants—not on the basis of their 
character and capacity – but by the accident of birth or origin.  
 Our present law fails to serve the nation by excluding men and women whose 
skills and talent could contribute much to American progress.  
 I intend to eliminate these failures. Our bill will permit families to reunite on 
American soil. I will bring people to these shore regardless of origin, if they want to 
come they can’ (LBJPL: 019, Johnson, 1965).  
 
Immigration reform is a controversial subject as it has not come without some 
disadvantages; the overall effect of immigration reform was far larger in scale that the 
administration had predicted.  When signing the bill Johnson also made these comments 
 
‘This is not a revolutionary bill. It does not affect the lives of millions….It will 
not reshape the structure of our daily lives or add importantly to either our wealth or 
our power (LBJPL: 020, Johnson, 1965). 
 
The demographic of America has dramatically changed since 1965 and the issue of identity 
has been a great source of debate, however, the diversity and opportunity that immigration 
reform has offered to people around the world and the American people has been vast, not 
to mention the inherently discriminatory quota policy is no longer a problem for those 
seeking a better life in America.  
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Civil Rights 
A prime example of Johnson’s undoubted legislative talent is the Civil Rights bill, a bill 
fervently opposed by many. Undoubtedly, Johnson’s greatest achievement was guiding the 
Civil Rights Bill through Congress, in no way was it an easy task either. Many would argue 
that it was Kennedy who put the Civil Rights legislative plan together and therefore the 
praise would lay with Kennedy, however, although Kennedy’s intentions were to get the bill 
through; the reality was that he was unable to. Johnson was not merely trying to get the bill 
passed to win votes and show people he was worthy of being president. He fought for the 
rights of Black Americans and other minorities because he had a deep belief in the equality 
of Americans and that all men are created equal (Kearns Goodwin, 1976). Johnson 
managed to overcome an 83 day filibuster and signed the bill into law on 2nd of July 1964. In 
1965 Johnson commented to an aide that ‘Kennedy couldn’t have got the Ten 
Commandments through Congress’ (Sundquist, 2009, pg. 216).  
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Environmental Policy 
The environmental legislation is not a topic that is usually addressed within the existing 
literature on the Johnson Presidency. ‘Unfortunately, much of the existing historical literature 
does not do justice to the Johnson period with respect to the environment (Lerner, pg 189, 
2012). However, it is an area in which Johnson had a great deal of involvement and the 
effects of the legislation that the Johnson Administration put in place made great strides in 
the regulation of pollution and the preservation of natural habitats and beauty spots in 
America. Not only did he improve the environment in America for generations to come, but 
he was determined to make National Parks and areas of natural beauty accessible to as 
many Americans as possible. LBJ was not alone in his quest to preserve and protect the 
wildlife, beauty and natural resources of America; his wife Lady Bird Johnson also had a 
large role to play in the various Beautification Acts and environmental policies (Lerner, 
2012). The environmental legislation was all part of Johnson’s Great Society and it included 
legislation such as the Clear Air, Water Quality and Clean Water Restoration Acts and 
Amendments. The Wilderness Act of 1964, Land and Water Conservation Act 1965, Solid 
Waste Disposal Act 1965, Motor Vehicle Air Pollution Control Act 1965, National Historic 
Preservation Act 1966, Endangered Species Act of 1966, National Trails System Act 1968, 
Wild and scenic Rivers Act 1968, Aircraft Noise Abatement Act 1968, National 
Environmental Policy Act of 1969.  
 
One of the most significant policies that Johnson was able to implement was the clean water 
acts and amendments. At the point of Johnson Presidency there was little restriction on what 
could be thrown into rivers, especially in urban areas where rivers were ‘flowing red with 
blood from slaughterhouses (Johnson, 1965). Johnson wanted to bring water pollution to an 
end. Up until this point there had been a laissez faire attitude towards pollution, but Johnson 
declared that ‘There is no excuse for paper mills pouring sulphuric acid into the lakes and 
the streams of the people of this country. There is no excuse—and we should call a spade a 
spade—for chemical companies and oil refineries using our major rivers as pipelines for 
toxic waste. There is no excuse for communities to use other people’s rivers as a dump for 
their raw sewage (Johnson, 1965). In a memo to Jack Valenti, Johnson’s aide, Walter 
Pozen, Assistant Secretary to the Interior, describes some the quality of some of the lakes, 
he describes that at Mockley Point, Maryland ‘this is the area where most of the debris, 
garbage and old tiers wash ashore’, he then goes on to describe that at Mason Neck, 
Virginia  the effects of the Washington Sewage Discharge are clear with ‘a thick mat of green 
algae on the surface and dead fish’ (LBJPL: 023, 1965).  
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Johnson signed into law around 300 environmental measures resulting in the most 
legislation of its kind passed by Congress in 187 years (Lerner, 2012). On the other hand, 
the Great Society environmental policy was, again, not just about implementing laws. In 
reference to Hargrove’s comments of legislative victories being the backbone of Johnson’s 
Great Society (Hargrove, 1974), the ideas and policies that came out of the Great Society 
were for the purpose of changing the mind frame of American society, although Johnson is 
focusing on sticking to old American values of looking after the land, new industry and 
technology meant that a new way of thinking about the environment and finding a balance 
between allowing industry to thrive and yet still preserving the land and resources that 
America has must be of the upmost importance. ‘Our conservation must be not just the 
classic conservation of protection and development, but a creative conservation of 
restoration and innovation’ (LBJPL: 024, 1965). Johnson also pledged his support to the 
International Hydrological Decade, this was a worldwide effort to advance knowledge on 
water related issues (Lerner, 2012). This was not a piece of legislation; it was a commitment 
to the advancement of knowledge and therefore an indication of how Johnson wanted not 
only a good legislative record but to really understand how America and the world could 
conserve natural resources. Johnson’s approach to the environment was very much in 
keeping with the liberal tone of the great society, while secretary Udall was somewhat of a 
traditionalist he praised Johnson extensively for his work as an ‘environmental president’  
 
A general conclusion—quite inescapably—Presidential leadership has 
changed the outlook of the nation with regards to conservation and has added vital 
“new dimensions.”  No longer is peripheral action – the “saving” of a forest, a park, a 
refuge for wildlife – Isolated form the mainstream. The total environment is now the 
concern and new conservationism makes man, himself, its subject. The quality of life 
is now the perspective of new conservation (Udall, 1968 cited in Lerner 2012). 
 
Johnson’s environmental policy is one aspect of the Great Society where the issues that are 
addressed here are not just significant to the poor in America. The environmental policy that 
was implemented in both urban and non-urban areas improved the quality of life for the vast 
majority. On the other hand, some of the policies that Johnson implemented had deep 
connections to the issues of equality and poverty. Johnson understood that not everybody 
had the means to appreciate the beauty of America’s National Parks, even though this was 
central to his idea of improving the quality of life for American people. Johnson added 50 
new National Parks as well as expanding those that already existed. He also introduced 
urban park sites within short distance of urban areas so as to improve accessibility to nature 
and open spaces even further (Dept. of Interior, National Park Service, 2013).  
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The 1960s was an era of environmentalism. Kennedy’s efforts in the environmental arena 
were there, but somewhat insignificant and anything that Kennedy tried to get through 
Congress was lacking in the fundamental changes that the Johnson administration brought 
with it. ‘His tragic death in 1963 leaves only speculation of how Kennedy would have fared 
as an “environmental president”. However, his lack of congressional support for his 
legislative initiatives was, as Irwin Unger stated, “at most half-hearted.” What he was able to 
accomplish was “either killed off or seriously watered down”’ (Lerner, 2012).  
 
In terms of institutional changes to the way Federal government regulated and implemented 
conservation, the strides made by the Johnson Administration created an environment in 
which consolidation of the of environmental agencies could be created. The struggle to 
reach a federal department that could bring together the various departments was not 
reached until 1970 when President Nixon proposed that the various agencies should be 
brought together as the Environmental protection Agencies, in order to regulate the National 
Environmental Act of 1969, signed on the 1st of January 1960. Throughout the Johnson 
administration, there had been many attempts to consolidate the various departments as the 
creation of environmental policy was reliant on the coordination and communication of the 
departments with only the executive as a central figure to unite them. The Johnson period 
seemed a likely time for the reorganisation of the departments, however all attempts were 
halted by vested interests (Lerner, 2012). It was not until 1970 that there was a major 
change in the way in which regulatory policy was decided. Once regulatory policy was in the 
hands of the Courts, public lobbyist and environmental groups were now in the competition 
for the federal agencies attention and therefore business could no longer have a hold over 
the agencies like it once did (McMahon, 2006). On the other hand, that is not to say that 
institutional change did not occur during the Johnson Presidency to some extent. The use of 
Task Forces and specialist ‘think tanks’ were a relatively new concept and played a vital role 
in feeding the Executive with the information needed to develop environmental policy, the 
office of Science and Technology being the most influential task force in advising the 
President on environmental quality.  
 
In summation environmental policy was a subject that was personal to Johnson and his wife. 
The revolutionary feeling of the 60s as a whole created an environment ripe for reform with 
more and more people starting to question the effects that industry was having on nature. 
Coupling this with Johnson’s passion for preserving nature and his extraordinary legislative 
skill, Johnson was able to change the course of Environmentalism in America, whilst also 
improving the quality of life for many American by creating wider access to nature regardless 
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of location or class. While it was not until the 1970s that concrete institutional change was 
implemented, it is arguably the actions and efforts of the Johnson administration that paved 
the way for the eventual establishment of the Environmental Protection Agency. Given 
President Nixon’s lack of interest in the environment (McMahon, 2006), it could be argued 
that it was a crucial time for the environment as it is hard to say whether any greater action 
would have been taken to clean up the mess that industry was creating and also to preserve 
parts of America for future generations.  
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Leadership and the Johnson Treatment  
 
To understand Johnson’s leadership style it is imperative to understand how he was able to 
behave in the manner he did. Johnson became powerful at a very young age, his political 
was career just starting at the age of 28 in 1936. By October 1940 his stance in the political 
arena changed dramatically. At this point he was a Junior Congressman writing to other 
more senior Congressmen asking for moments of their time. The switchover happened when 
he realised he was a person who had access to two different groups of people. On one hand 
he was friends with Texan oil men, willing to pay for federal favours, on the other hand he 
was friends with North Eastern liberals who needed money for campaigns. Johnson 
managed to persuade these oil men to channel all money through him. Within weeks these 
North Eastern Liberals knew that Johnson was the man to go to for money. (Caro, 2003) 
With this money he gained power. Johnson once claimed, ‘I do understand power, whatever 
else may be said about me, I know where to look for it, and how to use it.’ (Caro, 2002, pg. ii) 
Robert Caro claims that Johnson was a legislative genius in his book Lyndon Johnson: 
Master of the Senate. Johnson became Senate Majority Leader in 1953 and is regarded by 
authors such as Caro and Dallek as the most proficient and effective Senate leader ever. 
Johnson was in his element as Majority Leader, this is mainly down to Johnson’s skill and 
understanding of power. Caro describes Johnson at this time; ‘The face of Senate leader 
Lyndon Johnson, in his forties for most of his senatorial years, was the face of a man 
confident, cocky, tough, the face of a man in the full flush of power (Caro, 2003, pg. xvii). 
 
It is hard to distinguish whether the diversion of money through Johnson was a cause or 
effect of Johnson’s extremely overbearing method of convincing or coercing people into his 
mind frame but Johnson was notorious for his methods of persuasion. Johnson knew that 
when he was announcing his poverty bill he would face opposition and therefore used his 
persuasion skills and connections to make sure the rest of his party would vote for the bill. In 
a conversation to George Mahon in 1964 Johnson aired his concerns  
 
‘I’ll take a good look at it and I want you to take a good look now and help me 
on my poverty. That’s what the republicans want to beat, that one bill and I’m going 
to take tax eaters and make tax payers out of them and I’m going to stop these damn 
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riots. I’ve got everyone these cities, all these young people with nothing to do, sitting 
around, and I have got them to agree today, no more demonstrations. And they’re 
asking please, put these people to work, and I’m going to put 150,000 of them to 
work in 90 days’ time on useful, hard-working projects. Teach them some discipline, 
and when to get up and how to work all day and in two years I’ll have them trained, 
so they can at least drive a truck instead of sitting around a pool room all day’… ‘And 
I’ve got…. Halleck said that he’s going to have every Republican vote against it and 
this is the only bill that is strictly mine is the poverty bill.’  (Johnson, 1964) 
 
Here, Johnson is not only airing his concerns on the vote of the Republicans, he is also 
convincing Mahon to talk to every Democrat to vote for Johnson on this bill, in a later part of 
the conversation Johnson urges Mahon to help him until he eventually agrees. This was a 
common tactic of Johnson and regardless of the critics; it was a tactic that got results.  
 
Johnson used both his imposing physique and robust personality to cajole his peers into 
submission. Pictures were often taken catching Johnson standing inches away from the 
faces of those he was trying to persuade, most of the time laughing and on occasion 
scowling. Johnson’s methods were unique and arguably the reason he had such success 
with legislation. Caro claims that the Senate never worked more efficiently than when 
Johnson was majority leader. Arguably, the Johnson Treatment is the reason for this 
success.  Johnson was able to over-power, overwhelm and outsmart his opponents or the 
people he wanted on his side due to his relentless energy and commitment to politics. This 
meant Johnson was switched on all the time and never missed a trick. As Valenti put it ‘the 
LBJ work schedule was unending, a ceaseless collaboration of energy and sense of duty, 
was beyond any question’ (Valenti 1977, pg 123).  
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Great Society Failures  
 
Johnson brought in many programs to help the poor and disadvantaged in American but not 
all of the programs were successful and funding eventually became a problem for most. 
Author Robert Dallek talks of how the laws passed in 1964 were works in progress that 
never reached their full potential and that the War in Vietnam meant he never reached the 
promised land (Dallek, 1998). 
 Model Cities is an example of a Great Society project falling short of the mark. Model Cities 
was a program created alongside the Department of Housing and Urban Development and 
was the closest America had ever come to any sort of national policy for cities (Lerner, 
2012). However, the program did not live up to what was expected and showed signs of 
weakness in the Great Society in light of the Vietnam War and the funding problems that 
came with it. The program was severely underfunded and was constantly subject to 
bickering between management. There were many issues that meant Model Cities did not 
work, but these problems boil down to the fact that the War in Vietnam had taken its toll and 
as Dallek suggests, the speed in which some of the Great Society Policies were rushed 
through, meant that the War on Poverty was indeed a work in progress, and one that could 
have benefited immensely from the money and attention that the Vietnam War stripped away 
from it (Dallek, 1998) (Lerner, 2012).  
Another example of how the Great Society, and indeed Johnson himself, suffered was the 
backlash that was experience in light of Affirmative Action. The Civil Rights Act 1964 and 
Voting Rights Act of 1965 were a great success for the Johnson Administration and marked 
a significant watershed in history and the Civil Rights Movement. For Johnson, however, 
equality was not enough. Johnson saw equality not just as the breaking down of laws that 
restricted them from fully taking part in the democratic system but offering preferential 
treatment in employment and education to make up for past oppression. Johnson felt a duty 
to make up for lost time; the years of oppression that African American had suffered were 
not going to go away. On the other hand, no part of the Civil Rights movement called for 
anything more than equal rights therefore the preferential treatment that Affirmative Action 
programs provided was more than anyone had asked for. While for many African Americans, 
civil rights was the opportunity to level the playing field and then work towards their goals, on 
their own merit, not through the preferential treatment of an Executive Order (Fobanjong, 
2001). This understandably created a backlash, and the fact that Affirmative Action was 
brought about by an executive order, rather than through congress made it highly 
controversial. Not only was there a backlash from the African Americans who had fought so 
long for equality, not preferential treatment, but other white males were increasingly 
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frustrated at the Act. As the Executive order had eventually developed to include sex as a 
discriminatory factor, white males seemed to be the only group left out in the cold. 
Affirmative Action fell down in many areas. For a start it was seen as unconstitutional and 
worked against the Fourteenth Amendment which protects irrespective of race or sex. Not 
only was it unconstitutional but it ran in the opposite direction to the ethos of the Civil Rights 
Act (Fobanjong, 2001).  
While there is no doubt that Johnson got some aspect of the Great Society wrong, and many 
of the projects that he set up did not reach their full potential this is still not where the 
hegemonic cannon of literature stems from. As already stated, the negative and uneven 
evaluation of the Johnson Presidency largely stems from themes that are not as constructive 
in terms of evaluation as more explicit analysis of various aspects of his presidency would 
be.  
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Conclusions 
 
Today, there is evidence to suggest that it is deemed acceptable to enter into a state of 
amnesia when assessing the legacy of Johnson. It is also apparent that simply summing up 
his time in office as a ‘tragedy’ is common among literature and therefore this has transpired 
into the everyday assessment of Johnson. The Vietnam War, the Kennedy Assassination 
and Imperial Presidency are issues that are synonymous with his name. While many do 
regard Johnson as one of the most progressive social reformers of the century, his legacy, 
as we have seen, is overcome with negativity. In 2008, Joseph Califano, one of Johnson’s 
aids who worked closely with him on many Great Society projects made a speech at the LBJ 
Presidential Library in Austin, Texas. The speech was positive; it was a speech that 
addresses the same issues that are reflected in this paper and underlines the injustice of 
Johnson’s Legacy.   
  
‘The tragedy of Vietnam has created a dark cloud obscuring the full picture of 
Lyndon Johnson’s Presidency. Without downplaying in any way the tragedy of the 
Vietnam War, I am convinced that to make Lyndon Johnson the invisible President—
particularly for Democrats to indulge such amnesia as politically correct—is unfair not 
so much to him, but to our nation and its future’ (LBJPL:021, 2008). 
During the Presidential campaigns in 2008, Hilary Clinton made a comment that shocked the 
nation by referencing that it took a President, Lyndon Baines Johnson, to pass the Civil Right 
Act of 1964. The outrage was widespread across the nation, as if Clinton had done 
something more outrageous than correctly reciting a historical event (Mackenzie, 2008). 
While many saw this as an issue of race and a way of downplaying the efforts of the Civil 
Rights Movement, the real issue in the scandal is the willingness to disregard Johnson’s 
efforts to overcome the filibusters and use his extraordinary power and talent to once and for 
all pass the legislation that the Civil Rights Movement had worked so hard for. Califano 
commented on the incident in his speech saying that ‘she broke the taboo and mentioned 
President Johnson’ there was instant shock and retort against the comment and ‘Lyndon 
Johnson was put back in his place as the invisible President of the twentieth century’ 
(LBJPL, 022, Califano, 2008).  
An article in the Huffington Post also gave a rare glimpse of vibrant praise for Johnson in 
response to comments made by Republican Paul Ryan,  
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‘"We have spent $15 trillion from the federal government fighting poverty," Said Rep. 
Paul Ryan on Fox News last month, "and look at where we are, the highest poverty 
rates in a generation, 15 percent of Americans live in poverty".  
Ryan is speaking on behalf of millions of Americans who believe that the War on 
Poverty was a failure, when in fact it's one of the greatest success stories in our 
nation's history (Orlando, 2013). 
The comments in Orlando are related to the comparative poverty rates that stood at 50% in 
parts of the country before the War on Poverty. The fact remains that poverty was not 
eradicated; complete eradication of poverty through any policy by any leader is a far-fetched 
and ultimately impossible goal in a capitalist system.  We do know, however, that for many 
poor and underprivileged Americans, their chances of a better education, medical care and 
equality were significantly improved through the Great Society.  
The resistance to recognising Johnson as a great president of the 21st century is 
understandable, for many a product of the Vietnam conflict still present in the nation’s 
memory. The war was of course an event that can never be ignored. However, it is unfair to 
tar all aspect of Johnson’s time in office with the same brush. Today, there is no greater 
example of how Johnson has influenced American society and created more opportunity for 
American people than that of the current President. The fact that Johnson was missed out of 
Obama’s speech in 2008 is not surprising when considering the pattern of historical amnesia 
that has developed throughout the years; it is however surprising that Obama should forget 
Johnson as Obama’s Presidency is an intrinsic part of Johnson’s legacy. 
Johnson’s skill as a legislator is something that very few, if any, could criticise. Johnson 
clearly had the ability to push through bills and policies that many other experienced 
politicians and even presidents would struggle to push through. The one thing that is 
questionable is the morality of his methods. Was it Johnson’s abrasive and sometimes 
forceful manner that meant he got his own way? Or was it the experience and confidence he 
had gained throughout the years that meant he could duck and dive through the filibusters to 
get to his goal. However, the literature on the Johnson presidency, primarily the secondary 
literature, is not always focused on the success of the policies; the theme that is most 
common in the secondary literature is the theme of personality and Johnson’s apparent 
preoccupation with power. This has resulted in some of the more positive aspects of 
Johnson’s presidency, such as his legislative skill, being turned into the reasons he failed. 
For example, when discussing the speed and efficiency in which he was able to pass 
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legislation, Hargrove claims that this was only a product of Johnson’s attempts to show a 
good legislative box score (Hargrove, 1974). However, this is not the only issue. The 
secondary literature is not just creating a false image of the Johnson presidency purely 
through what it is saying, but rather what it is not saying. The lack of detail in the secondary 
literature is an issue, as we can see from the archival analysis in this thesis; there is more to 
the Johnson Presidency that what the secondary literature is explaining. Arguably, if the 
author was to include more detail of the Great Society in their books, it would alter the tone 
of the book drastically, no longer relying on the shock value of describing Johnson as the 
power hungry and borderline psychotic Imperial President. While there is no denying that the 
Great Society had its downfalls, it is significant that it is not the description of the failed 
policies that set the tone of the secondary literature, it is the description of the man himself 
and his psychology that dominate the literature.  
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Reflections on the Research  
Throughout this thesis there were challenges and issues that had to be overcome, the first of 
which being the issue of Vietnam. Vietnam is a very important aspect of the Johnson 
Presidency and is in many ways a sensitive topic. While it is extremely important that 
Vietnam is not undervalued in this reassessment; this thesis does steer away from the issue 
for the purposes of re-evaluating Johnson without following the biographical cannon most 
literature follows. The main issue is striking the right balance between including Vietnam in 
the appropriate proportion, and not letting it overshadow the other aspects of Johnson’s time 
in office.  After conducting the archival research that features in this thesis, it was important 
that care was taken to present the data and the literature as evenly as possible and without 
being too biased. It was important to highlight the fact that Johnson’s Presidency was indeed 
plagued by various issues and this is also taken into account when assessing the 
hypothesis.  
Overall, this thesis demonstrates that a hegemonic biographical narrative has developed 
predominantly through the secondary literature on the Presidency of Lyndon Baines 
Johnson. By using Narrative Inquiry it has been possible to establish how this narrative has 
developed through the use of primary literature and the experiences and opinions of the 
author themselves. This has been very useful in terms of gaining an overall insight into the 
literature as it allows the reader to compare and contrast the opinions and theories on 
Johnson over a broader scope of literature. This, in turn, has highlighted the key, and rather 
negative, themes of the work and reaffirmed the notion that a biographical cannon has 
developed. By using Archival Research as a secondary research method it is possible to 
challenge this views and key themes that are established within the literature in question. 
We can see from the archival section of this thesis, that it is possible to look deeper into his 
presidency and understand some of the intricacies that were part of the Great Society. By 
looking further into the development of the Great Society and examining certain aspects of 
his social policy with greater detail, it is apparent that there are other elements of the 
Johnson Presidency that portray a different side of the story. At this point, it is apparent that 
the archival data is contradicting the key themes of the literature, therefore proving a 
conclusion to the interrelated hypothesis that a hegemonic biographical cannon has 
developed, and that this view can be challenged by using archival research.  This is very 
significant as the legacy of Johnson is influenced greatly by literature and when this literature 
is somewhat under developed, so is Johnson’s legacy.  
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